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Chapter 1
Introduction
The present thesis collects four papers that aim at contributing to different fields of eco-
nomics. The analyses encompass intertemporal consumption, industrial organization, and
the economics of migration. Nothwithstanding this diversity, all papers have three elements
in common:
i. a strong emphasis on clean and credible research design;
ii. an effort to develop simple but general theoretical models that can guide the empirical
research;
iii. the use of highly detailed (and novel) micro-data.
As effectively put forward by Angrist and Pischke in their provocative article on “the credi-
bility revolution in empirical economics” [5], what makes an empirical analysis credible is a
clean research design in which the identification assumptions (i.e., the conditions that must
be met for the assignment to the treatment to be considered random with respect to any
non-ignorable confounding factor) are crystal clear. Although identification assumptions are,
in most of the cases, not directly testable, the researcher should defend them on the basis of
sound theoretical reasoning, indirect evidence, and (last but not least) basic reasonability.
It is ultimately on the basis of this defense (along with formal statistical tests whenever they
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are possible) that the soundness of any empirical strategy must be evaluated.
It is really a non-contentious fact that this approach that emphasizes the development and
defense of credible research design has become the prevailing one in most of the empirical
literature over the past two decades (Angrist and Pischke [5]). This movement, however,
has not come without critics. In their recent contribution to the Handbook of Econometrics,
Heckman and Vytlacil [33] argue that the emphasis on the identification of treatment effects
has favored simplicity in estimation to the cost of “obscurity in interpretation”. In short,
they claim that researchers have tended to overlook the link between theory and empirical
analyses, up to the point that the relationship between estimated effects and theoretical
structural parameters has blurred. Using the terminology of Holland [35], while the treat-
ment effect literature has been able to understanding the “effects of causes”, it has become
less and less able to identify the “causes of effects”.
In the researches collected in this volume, I tried to partially take charge of this critical point:
in all the papers there is a fairly general theoretical model which informs me about what
the empirical analysis allows me to identify. In contrast to the more structural approach
supported by Heckman and Vytlacil, however, I do not necessarily claim that the theoretical
model identifies all the set of counterfactuals and all the set of confounding factors that
can be rationalized, nor that the resulting equations (or, better, their stochastic counter-
parts) must be directly estimated. Indeed, no theoretical model gives a complete picture of
the reality: it solely highlights some of the aspects that are mostly prominent. From this
consideration, the central role of checking the robustness of the findings to alternative (non-
modelled but still reasonable) explanations emerges: it is a core element of any treatment
effect analysis. Moreover, in several cases the theoretical model is too simple to be directly
estimated, although it does help the researcher in understanding what he is estimating, and
in defining the correct research design.1
1As a partial exception, see Chapter 3, where I obtain a linearized equation that can be directly esti-
mated. Even in that case, however, robustness checks are fundamental to assess whether other non-modelled
explanations are responsible for the estimated effect. Although the result is robust to these explanations
in terms of significance, I obviously cannot rule out that they play a role in defining the strength of the
8
Finally, all empirical analyses in this volume exploit large panel datasets, usually character-
ized by a big-N x big-T structure. In all cases, data come from big consultancy firms and
were originally collected for marketing purposes. The use of this type of real-life data, which
has been increasingly collected over the last fifteen years thanks to the development of ICT
in both private and public organizations, represents a fundamental improvement for empir-
ical capabilities in economics. However, although availability of millions of observations has
the virtue of placing the researcher in the realm of Asymptopia, it does not make causal
identification much easier. Indeed, identifying sources of exogenous variation in relevant
regressors is still largely a matter of creativity, wit, and knowledge of econometric tools. I
hope that the reader will find in these essays some evidence of all three of them.
The volume is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the first paper that deals with
identifying monthly cycle in consumption and shopping behaviors linked to paydays. The
paper presents a critical analysis of previous literature and, as a novel contribution, identifies
the shopping cycle (i.e., the fact that consumers tend to shop for food in larger groceries
at payday and in smaller shops in the rest of the month). It shows both theoretically and
empirically that the shopping cycle represents a relevant confounding factor for identifying
intertemporal preferences using high-frequency expenditure data.
In Chapter 3, I build on these findings and develop a test for the joint identification of liquid-
ity constraints and time-inconsistency using data on daily expenditures from a large sample
of households observed both before and during the current economic crisis. The idea is to
look at how consumers that face a drop in available resources smooth consumption between
monthly paydays. Theory predicts that time-consistency and/or perfect access to capital
markets would result in a constant growth rate of consumption over the month. Empirical
identification exploits the rich data available using a triple-differences model that controls
for the confounding factors via fixed-effects.
In Chapter 4, I study the effect of an inflow of less informed consumers in a market of retail
estimated effect. Thus, any attempt to calibrate this (as any) model is bound to fail.
9
goods on the expected equilibrium price and quantity, and assess how competition affects
this effect. Theory predicts that such an inflow should raise the equilibrium price, as firms
can extract a rent from lack of information by consumers. However, this “rent extraction
effect” should be reduced by competition, due to the countervailing incentive to increase
market share. In the paper, co-authored with Giacomo Calzolari, Andrea Ichino, and Viki
Nellas, we gather data from a large sample of Italian pharmacies and their monthly sold
quantity and price charged on a basket of child hygiene products over the period 2007-2010.
We study the effect of an increase in the monthly number of newborns on the equilibrium
price and quantity, under the assumption that parents of newborns are new consumers and,
thus, more likely to be imperfectly informed on the market prices. Consistently with the the-
ory, we find that a raise in newborns at the municipal level increases the average expected
price in the City for this basket of goods. We identify a set of thresholds (based on the
municipal population) set by the Law to define the number of pharmacies allowed to enter
the market. We exploit them using a Regression Discontinuity framework. Thanks to this
identification strategy, we find that a larger number of competitors has a negative effect on
the elasticity of price to changes in newborns, consistently with the theoretical predictions.
Finally, Chapter 5 reports the preliminary findings from a study of the effect of an inflow
of immigrants on the distribution of prices within cities that I am conducting with Antonio
Accetturo, Sauro Mocetti, and Elisabetta Olivieri. We develop a spatial equilibrium model
that shows how immigration shock to a neighborhood propagates to the rest of the city
through changes in local amenities and local prices. On the empirical side, we collect data
at the neighbourhood level for a sample of main Italian cities and we analyze the impact of
immigration on natives’ residential choice and house price dynamics. We find that there is a
negative relationship between changes in native population and changes in immigrant popu-
lation across neighbourhoods; we also find some evidence that price growth is lower than the
average in those neighbourhoods where immigrants settle. Second, we extend the analysis
to all Italian municipalities and we investigate the impact of immigration on indicators of
10
city price distribution. We find that immigration causes an increase in the average price.
This effect, however, is driven by the upper two deciles of the price distribution: the effect
on immigration on lower prices is never statistically different from zero.
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Chapter 2
The Monthly Cycle of Consumption
and the Role of Shopping Costs
Francesco Manaresi1
First draft: December 2009
This draft: April 2011
1I thank Federdistribuzione, notably Stefano Crippa, for providing financial support for purchasing the
ACNielsen data. My gratitude goes to Dr. Danilo Villa from Esselunga: without his genuine interest this
research could have never been performed.
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Abstract
Recent studies documented that consumption of poor households falls markedly between
paydays (a phenomenon called ‘paycycle’), and considered this finding as a rejection of the
permanent income hypothesis (PIH) and evidence of liquidity constraints and time inconsis-
tency (modelled with hyperbolic preferences). In this paper, I criticize and extend previous
analyses of the paycycle, arguing that standard tests may have omitted a crucial confounding
factor that may have biased the results toward the rejection of the PIH. I show theoretically
that when households change the shopping regime over the month in a cyclical (and rational)
way a paycycle may emerge even if the households are time consistent. I test my results
using a panel dataset that provides daily information on food expenditures from a large
sample of Italian households. This is the first analysis of the monthly cycle in expenditures
and consumption outside the US and UK. Results show that households display a monthly
cycle in shopping behavior: the probability of performing a shopping trip in a larger su-
permarket is higher at payday and decrease afterward. The paycycle appears to be driven
by this shopping cycle, while the pure effect of time preferences result in a flat pattern of
consumption between paydays.
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2.1 Introduction
Several recent studies have documented that household food consumption responds to the
monthly inflow of income. Notably, food consumption has been found to fall steepely in the
period between paydays (Stephens Jr. [62] [63], Shapiro [61]), a phenomenon which has been
called ‘paycycle’ of consumption (Mastrobuoni and Weinberg [51]). Since monthly income
is predictable, transitory, and exogenous, the paycycle represents a clear rejection of the
rational expectations-permanent income hypothesis (RE-PIH, henceforth).
Previous analyses focused on the US or UK: as a first contribution, this paper extends the
analysis to Italy. I use a unique panel dataset that collects information on daily food expen-
ditures from a large sample of households to provide evidence of the paycycle among Italian
consumers. Results are consistent with previous analyses showing that the cycle is partic-
ularly strong among liquidity constrained households (as identified by age or education of
the household head). Total food expenditures decrease by more than 10% between paydays
for this subgroup, while quantities purchased of fruits and vegetables (i.e. highly perishable
food for which expenditures and consumption are more likely to coincide) decrease by 5 to
6%.
All previous studies have explained the paycycle with the existence of self-control prob-
lems. According to this view, liquidity constrained individuals do not resist temptation and
over-consume when they receive their monthly income: as a result, they fall short of cash-on-
hands at the end of the month and are forced to reduce consumption. This time-inconsistent
behavior has been formalized using hyperbolic discounting functions (Strotz [65], Phelps and
Pollak [55], and Laibson [45]), or other modelling techniques (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer [30]).
On this regard, as a second original contribution, I point to a relevant confounding factor
that could not be controlled for by previous studies and may have biased their results toward
the rejection of the null-hypothesis of time-consistency. In my theoretical framework, the
paycycle emerges because liquidity constrained households shop in bigger/farther supermar-
kets when they receive the monthly payment, in order to rebuild stocks of food, while they
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go to smaller/nearer shops during the rest of the month to continue purchasing more perish-
able food (such as fruits and vegetables, milk, etc.). Since prices are higher in smaller shops
than in bigger supermarkets, this cycle in shopping behavior generates a fall in quantities
of perishable food consumed over the month, i.e. a paycycle. Thus, the paycycle may be
determined by the combined effects of different perishability in food categories (some being
stockable for larger periods while others are not), implicit or explicit liquidity constraints
(that induce preference for rebuilding food stocks at paydays), and the structure of grocery
market, in which there is a trade-off between proximity and convenience (i.e. between fixed
costs of travel and marginal price differentials).
I provide evidence of this phenomenon for Italy thanks to a rich dataset that provides infor-
mation on the type of shop in which each purchase has been performed. Several theoretical
predicitons are confirmed. First, liquidity constrained households display a shopping cycle:
the probability of performing a trip to a supermarket or a hyperstore declines markedly
between paydays. This effect is particularly prominent for liquidity constrained households.
Second, once I control for the effect of the shopping cycle, the paycycle disappears, and the
pattern of intra-monthly consumption is ultimately flat both for liquidity constrained and
unconstrained households, showing no evidence of time-inconsistency.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reports a critical review of the studies that
have analysed the paycycle. I present the dataset used for the empirical exercises in Section
2.3. Section 2.4 replicates the analyses performed by previous literature and shows that my
findings are ultimately consistent with it. Section 2.5 sketches a simple theoretical model to
show how a paycycle may emerge even if the consumer is perfectly rational and discounts
future utility exponentially. Section 2.6 presents the first estimate of the shopping cycle, and
shows that it is consistent with the implications of the theoretical model. Section 2.7 studies
the paycycle controlling for the effect of the shopping cycle, and shows that no significant
fall is present: households seem to smooth consumption exponentially between paydays.
Robustness checks of this finding are provided in Section 2.8. Finally, Section 2.9 concludes.
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2.2 Previous empirical findings and their interpreta-
tion
The analysis of the paycycle is a relatively new issue in the consumption literature.
The earliest contribution is attributable to Melvin Stephens Jr. [62], who uses data on daily
expenditures from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). In order to identify the
effect of the distance from payday on expenditure, he focuses on households receiving at
least 70% of their income from Social Security benefits. These benefits are paid in all the
US on the 3rd of the month: the distance from payday is then identified in the data as
the difference between the interview date and the 3rd of the month. This strategy has an
additional positive by-product: since the interview date is arguably random with respect to
any observable or unobservable household characteristic, it is possible to obtain unbiased
estimate of the paycycle. A problematic issue, shared even by the present paper, emerges
for what regards the identification of consumption: since the CES collects information on
expenditures, to study the cycle in consumption Stephens Jr. has to focus on those food
categories that cannot be stockpiled.
His results are at odds with the standard predictions of the RE-PIH. He finds that expen-
diture on instant consumption goods are 20% higher right after payday with respect to the
rest of the month. For fresh fruits and vegetables, the peak at payday is at around 9% and
significant. He does not perform any analysis of the causes of such a rejection of the RE-PIH.
Stephens Jr. [63] replicates and extends the analysis using the UK Family Expenditure Sur-
vey (FES). He improves on his previous study in two dimensions. First, the dataset provides
direct information on the payday of each household and this allows him to extend the anal-
ysis to households that do not receive Social Security benefits, and to control for possible
day-of-the-calendar-month effect. Second, since each household is observed for two weeks,
the author can control for household unobserved heterogeneity. The results are consistent
with those obtained for the US, although the paycycle seems less strong: expenditure on
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instant consumption goods and services peaks by 6% at payday with respect to the rest of
the month. In addition, the paper reports some evidence of the role of liquidity constraints
(as proxied by low wealth or low age) in explaining the paycycle.
Jesse Shapiro [61] focuses on household participating in the US food stamps project. He ex-
ploits the Continuing Survey on Food Intake by Individuals (CSFII) that collects information
on daily food intake. Thus, he is able to overcome the problem of identifying consumption.
However, data limitations do not allow him to control for day-of-the-month effect and house-
hold unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, in the econometric specification he imposes a
linear trend on the effect of distance from payday on (log)caloric intake, a rather strong
assumption that is rejected by subsequent studies.
Nothwithstanding these limitations, this study has been particularly influential, since it is
the first to point to time-inconsistency as a possible explanation of the paycycle. To maintain
this thesis, Shapiro calibrates an exponential and a quasi-hyperbolic model of intertemporal
consumption, using the results of his econometric exercise. He shows that the exponential
model results in either implausibly low estimate of the discount factor, or in too high esti-
mate of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, while the quasi-hyperbolic model yields
results of the δ and the ρ parameters that are in line with the standard results of the con-
sumption literature, and a β at around 0.96.
A similar calibration exercise is performed by Huffman and Barenstein [36], who use the
FES to provide additional insights in the behavior of UK households. They show that the
paycycle is particularly prominent for expenditures out of cash on hand, while purchases per-
formed via credit card are generally flatter: they interpret this finding as evidence of mental
accounting (Thaler [67]). The result of their calibration again points to quasi-hyperbolic
discounting as a better hypothesis to model household consumption behavior with respect
to exponential discounting.
Mastrobuoni and Weinberg [51] use the CSFII to study the behavior of Social Security
recipients. They find a fundamental heterogeneity between the behavior of high and low
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wealth households: the former display a flat consumption pattern over the month, while the
latter show strong evidence of a paycycle. They explain the cycle as the product of time-
inconsistency. They study the consumption pattern of an agent who has to consume all his
resources within one month, and show that this differs according to the type of discount
function assumed: an exponential agent would display a constant declinig consumption pat-
tern, while a quasi-hyperbolic discount function would result in a concave declining path.
They provide evidence that the consumption of the low-wealth Social Security recipients
follow the lattern pattern.
Although the evidence on the existence of a paycycle reported by Stephens Jr., Shapiro,
Huffman and Barenstein, and Mastrobuoni and Weinberg are robust, time-inconsistency
may not be the sole factor explaining it. Indeed, the theoretical model used by previous
authors to sustain the case of time-inconsistency is the standard one, usually used to ex-
plain monthly or quarterly consumption behavior. The application of it to high frequency
settings, however, may not be so immediate. At daily or weekly frequencies there may be
important confounding factors that explain the monthly cycle in consumption without any
need of time-inconsistency. In the next section I point to one of these possible alternative
explanations.
2.3 Data and identification issues
To investigate the linkage between consumption and monthly payment receipt I use the
2007 ACNielsen Homescan Panel (henceforth, Homescan). The Homescan is a nationally
representative panel of 6,655 households that provide daily information on expenditure on
grocery goods (food, housecare, and healthcare goods). A portable scanner is provided to
the household head, and he/she is asked to scan the barcode of each good purchased. This
information is sent weekly to ACNielsen. The multinational firm, then, matches the codebars
with the corresponding price paid thanks to a dataset of grocery prices called ScanTrack. For
goods lacking barcodes, households are asked to fill a daily diary that includes information
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on prices and quantities of each product purchased as well as the place in which it has been
bought.2
For each household, I obtained the following information: geographic area (province level),
household size (five groups), household head age (five groups), education of the household
head (threee groups: elementary, upper secondary, and tertiary), and income. For what
regards income, ACNielsen calculates for each household the income per adult equivalent,
using the OECD equivalence scale.3 It then groups households according to whether they
belong to the first two deciles of the income distribution, the third to fifth deciles, the sixth
to eight deciles, or the upper two deciles.
To identify payday, an ad hoc questionnaire was administered in which each household
member was asked whether he/she receives income in a fixed date of the calendar month,
whether this fixed income is a wage or a pension benefit, and in which period of the month it
is received. The calendar month was divided into 10 periods of three days each (henceforth,
triplets), so that detail of paydays is available at the triplet level.4 Around 64% of households
received the questionnaire, the remaining share was no longer participating to Homescan in
2009 and could not be contacted. The response rate was 63.2% among these households,
and among the households who responded 90.5% provided at least one payday. Thus, I have
information on paydays for 2,123 households. Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics of all
households in the Homescan panel and of the subsample of those households who answered
the 2009 questionnaire. Differences by socio-demographic characteristics are usually not sta-
tistically significant, the exceptions are represented by a lower share of larger households
(5 components or more), and a lower share of very-low income families among those who
2Einav et al. [24] tested the reliability of this system of data collection and found that errors present in
the Homescan dataset are of the same order of magnitude of those present in standard datasets on earning
and employment. See the Appendix for a parallel test, that documents that the Italian Homescan data yields
results which are in line with those obtained from the consumption survey of the Italian National Statistical
Institute (ISTAT).
3All adults except the household head have weight equal to 0.7, children under 16 have weight equal to
0.5.
4Obviously the tenth triplet varies in length between 1 day (in Febrary) to 4 days, depending on the
month. By calculating the average daily consumption for each triplet, I overcome this problem.
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provided information on paydays.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of paydays over the calendar month. There are three main
modes: one at the beginning of the month (the first triplet of calendar days), a second one
(smaller) at the fourth triplet (between the 10th and the 12th of the month), and the last one
at the ninth triplet. In Figure 2.2 I distinguish between wage and pension earners. Pension
receipts are strongly concentrated at the beginning of the month, a fact that has been used
for the US case by Stephens Jr. [62] and Mastrobuoni and Weinberg [51] to identify the pay-
day. Wage receipts are, instead, more uniformly spread over the calendar month, although
the modes at the fourth and the ninth triplets persist. Such a good degree of variation in
paydays allows me to control for the effect of the calendar day of the month in our estimate
of the paycycle: this was not possible in most previous studies that concentrated solely on
pension earners or food-stamps receivers.
An additional identification issue emerges for households reporting more than one payday.
To obtain a clear picture of the paycycle, I focus on those households whose paydays are
concentrated in two adjacent triplets at most: this leaves me with 1,365 households for the
analysis. I consider different thresholds for the definition of a payday in the section on ro-
bustness checks.
From ACNielsen, I obtained three daily time series for each household: total grocery expen-
diture, expenditure on fresh fruits and vegetables, and average price paid per kilo of fresh
fruits and vegetables purchased. The first category, that practically coincide with total food
expenditures, is commonly used for consumption analyses at monthly or quarterly frequency
(e.g. with the PSID or the CEX datasets). However, at higher frequency, most food cat-
egories do not perish immediately: they can be purchased, stored, and they release their
services as durables over one month. Thus, total grocery expenditure cannot be used to
infer consumption at high frequency. I, therefore, focus on fresh fruits and vegetables, as
a food category for which expenditure and consumption are more likely to coincide. I use
the price vector to identify quantities consumed. In addition, I aggregate data from each
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month in five groups of six days each, starting with the payday, and calculate the average
daily consumption in each of these periods. The main identifying hypothesis, then, is that
at this six-days level of aggregation, expenditure and consumption coincide for fresh fruits
and vegetables.
I define the month that follows a payday as the “paymonth” and, with a small semantic
slide, the six-days groups in which it is parted as “payweeks”.
Crucially, ACNielsen provided information on where each purchasing event took place, distin-
guishing between supermarkets and small shops.5 For each triplet of days, I define a dummy
equal to 1 if some food expenditure was performed in a supermarket, and zero otherwise. I
consider it a proxy of whether the household has incurred in the fixed cost sketched in the
model of Section 2.5. This proxy is somehow conservative, since many supermarket chains
have smaller stores in the city centers, and purchases in these smaller supermarkets may
entail lower fixed costs. This fact, however, should bias our estimate toward the rejection of
any relationship between the shopping regime chosen and the distance from payday.
2.4 The paycycle among Italian households
Using the afore-mentioned identification hypotheses, it is possible to study the paycycle in
Italy with the Homescan panel. The analysis is similar to the one performed by Stephens
Jr. [63] for UK: heterogeneity in paydays allows me to control for day-of-the-month effects,
while the availability of a panel dimension permits the use of a fixed-effect estimator. In
addition, by aggregating observations at a six-days interval, I overcome the problem of
censoring in the dependent variable that would be otherwise present.
The baseline econometric specification to study the percentage change in weekly expenditures
5The supermarket category includes even hyperstores, wholesalers, etc.
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and consumption of household i at time t is:
logCit =
5∑
k=2
βkPWEEKk + φit + ai + it (2.1)
with
φit = DOMit +DOWit +MONTHit +Holit + PHolit
where Cit can be alternatively total weekly expenditures on grocery goods or weekly quan-
tities of fruits and vegetables consumed, PWEEKk are dummies for the payweeks 2-5, φit
is a vector of calendar effects, ai is household unobserved heterogeneity, and it is an i.i.d.
error term. Among the calendar effects, DOM stands for day of the month, DOW for day
of the week, MONTH is a calendar month fixed effect, Hol and PHol are dummies equal
to 1 if there is a holiday or a pre-holiday (respectively) within the payweek.
Table 2.2 reports results of the estimate of (2.1) omitting the calendar effects (specifications
1 and 3) or including them (specifications 2 and 4). In both cases the paycycle is significant:
total expenditures drop by 6.1% in the second payweek, and remains ultimately constant for
the rest of the month, slightly increasing in the fifth payweek to -4.9% with respect to the
first week of the paymonth. The left panel of the Table focus on quantities of fresh fruits
and vegetables, as a food category for which consumption and expenditures are likely to
coincide at the payweek level. The drop is particularly significant in the second payweek of
the month (-4.2%). Weekly consumption raises a bit in the subsequent payweeks reaching
-2.9% with respect to payday.
As previously argued, past researches have shown that the paycycle is particularly prominent
among low income/low wealth households (e.g. liquidity constrained households, pensioners
with no wealth, food-stamps receivers, etc.). It is important, then, to investigate whether
there are evidence of heterogeneity in consumption smoothing among the sample. I con-
sider two different measures of liquidity constraints. First, age has been recognized as a
good predictor of difficulties in accessing credit (Jappelli [40]) so I split the sample between
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households whose head is under 45 and those whose head is 45 or older. Younger households
are expected to be more likely to be liquidity constrained, since they have lower savings and
would like to borrow against future increases in labor income. Forty percent of the house-
hold in the sample belongs to the first group, while 60% have an old head. Alternatively, I
split the sample according to the education level of the household head. Evidence from the
Italian Survey on Household Income and Wealth show that a low education level of the head
is positively correlated with the probability of being liquidity constrained (Magri [48], Guiso
et al. [29]).6 Thus, I distinguish between households whose head has a primary or lower
secondary education (30.4% of the sample), and those whose head has an upper secondary
or tertiary education.
Estimate are then replicated controlling for possible different effects of the distance from
payday between the two subgroups. The model used for the estimate is:
logCit =
5∑
k=2
βkPWEEKk +
5∑
h=2
δhPWEEKh ∗ UNCONSTi + φit + ai + it (2.2)
with
φit = DOMit +DOWit +MONTHit +Holit + PHolit
When I use household head’s age as a proxy for liquidity constrained UNCONSTi is a
dummy equal to 1 if the head is aged 45 or more. Alternatively, when the sample is splitted
by education level, it is a dummy equal to 1 if the head has at least an upper secondary
education. Results of estimating (2.2) for total grocery expenditures and weekly consumption
of fresh fruits and vegetables are reported in Table 2.3.
The left panel splits the panel by age. The paycycle in total grocery expenditures looks
significant in both young and old headed households: the monthly fall reaches slightly more
than 6%. Looking at weekly consumption of fruits and vegetables, instead, shows a more
6Here, obviously, causality goes in both directions, since lower education reduces labor income and thus
increases the probability of living at the substitance level; if households do not access the credit market, on
the contrary, they may be less likely to invest in education.
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strong difference between the young and the elderly: while consumption drops by 5% since
the third payweek, for the latter the consumption pattern is flat over the month. Stronger
discrepancies are highlighted if I split the sample according to the education level of the
household head. The cycle in total grocery expenditures is significant both for low and
high education households, but it is much more pronounced among the former: weekly
expenditures among the lower educated drop by more than 10% after the third payweek,
reaching -13.1% in the fourth and -11.5% in the last one. For what regards higher educated
households, instead, the monthly peak is reached in the second payweek (+2.1% with respect
to payday), and then expenditures decline at around -5.7% (-3.8% with respect to the first
payweek). Thus, using any of the two proxies for liquidity constraints, the paycycle in weekly
consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables is significant only among those which are more
likely to be liquidity constrained.
These results are consistent with those obtained by Melvin Stephens Jr. [63], although the
paycycle seems remarkably less strong for the Italian case: for UK, Stephens Jr. found
that total food expenditures drop by 12.6% between the first and the last week of the
paymonth, and consumption of fresh food drops by 5.4%. Focusing on liquidity constrained
households (as proxied with asset income) furtherly increase the strength of the paycycle:
the drop in total food expenditures and in fresh food consumption reach -15.7% and -10.5%,
respectively. Other estimate by Stephens Jr. [62], Shapiro [61], Huffman and Barenstein [36],
and Mastrobuoni and Weinberg [51] are more difficult to compare to my findings, since they
focus on smaller subsamples of the population (as discussed in Section 2.2). Nonetheless,
their qualitative results are similar to mine. All previous studies have considered the paycycle
as an evidence of self-control problems, as modelled with hyperbolic discounting preferences.
In the next Section, however, I suggest a different explanation based on liquidity constraints
and heterogeneity in the shopping behavior chosen by consumers.
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2.5 Shopping and price regimes: a model
At low frequency, food consumption is not subject to substantial trade-offs: individuals have
to feed themselves and this need can hardly be compensated by other goods. At high fre-
quency, however, the utility obtained from consuming according to a smooth pattern can
be limited by the existence of other types of needs or costs. One of these is represented by
shopping costs.
Going shopping for food entails a fixed cost in terms of time spent and travel costs that is
paid for each trip. It is widely recognized that the price of food a consumer faces is sub-
jected to a huge heterogeneity with respect to the place in which it is purchased (Fox [25]).
The literature documents that the nearest a place is to residential areas the higher is the
price charged by groceries (Bell et al. [7]). Shopping in the neighborhood, however, entails
a significant lower cost in terms of time. Thus, anytime a consumer has to purchase food,
she has to trade-off marginal price gains with fixed costs of shopping.
A large part of the food categories that are consumed daily, in addition, are characterized by
short perishability, so that they must be purchased several times in a month. The interplay
between shopping costs and food perishability has important implications for the paycycle.
To show this consider the following stylized problem of intertemporal shopping and con-
sumption.7 A consumer has to allocate its monthly income I to the consumption of two
types of food: one that can be stored for one month (‘non-perishable’, NP , e.g. pasta and
cereals, beverages, meat, etc.) and one that rots in less than one month (‘perishable’, P ,
e.g. milk, fruits and vegetables, etc.). No borrowing and no saving is possible from outside
the month, so that she has to rely on I for her consumption. Assume, for simplicity, that
preferences are weakly separable between the two goods.8 Let the month be divided into
two equally spaced periods, t ∈ {1, 2}: the NP food rots completely in two periods, while
7The model can be considered a two-periods adaptation of Moffitt’s [53] model of social stigma, for an
early application of it to the food-stamps cycle see Wilde and Ranney [69].
8As long as the goods are not perfect substitutes, the result remains qualitatively unchanged.
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the P food lasts only one period and, thus, must be purchased twice per month.9
Shopping can be done into two types of grocery: a supermarket (S), where marginal prices
are pi, i ∈ {P,NP}, and a small shop (D), where prices are higher, qi > pi. Shopping in
the supermarket, however, entails a fixed cost θ > 0 in terms of utility. This cost represents
the value of proximity of the grocery to the consumer, and is useful to identify the afore-
mentioned trade-off. Besides the consumption decision, the agent has an additional control
variable, st, which is a dummy equal to 1 if she chooses to shop in S at time t.
Let the utility function for this two-periods problem be:
U(cNP,t, cP,t, I) = u(cNP,1) + u(cP,1) + θs1 + δ [u(cNP,2) + u(cP,2) + θs2] (2.3)
At time t = 1, the consumer chooses to shop in S if the utility gain from being charged a
lower price is larger than the fixed cost θ:
Gain from NP food︷ ︸︸ ︷
u(c∗NP,1|s1 = 1) + δu(c
∗
NP,2|s1 = 1)− u(c
∗
NP,1|s1 = 0)− δu(c
∗
NP,2|s1 = 0)
+
Gain from P food︷ ︸︸ ︷
u(c∗P,1|s1 = 1)− u(c
∗
P,1|s1 = 0) > θ (2.4)
where the asterisks signal the (conditional) optimal choices.
In the second period, instead, the consumer chooses the S shop if
u(c∗P,2|s2 = 1)− u(c
∗
P,2|s2 = 0) > θ (2.5)
These two conditions imply that it is always suboptimal to go shopping first in the small
shop at time t = 1 and then in the supermarket at t = 2. To see this, notice that the gains
from shopping in the supermarket for the NP food in (2.4) are always weakly positive, since
pNP < qNP . In addition, as long as δ ≤ 1, and for any well-behaved utility function, the
gains from shopping in the supermarket for the P food in (2.4) are always weakly larger
9Using explicit depreciation rates does not change the qualitative results of the model.
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than the LHS of (2.5). Thus, the LHS of (2.4) is always weakly larger than the LHS of (2.5)
and it will be optimal for the consumer either to purchase in the same type of shop in both
periods, or to switch from the supermarket to the small shop overtime, tertium non datur.
It is useful to compare how consumption declines over the month in these different situa-
tions. To do this, let us assume that the instantaneous utility function is of the CRRA type:
u(•) = •1−ρ/(1− ρ). The rate of decline in consumption of the P food, if the consumer does
not change the shopping place over the month (i.e. always shops either in S or in D) is
δ
1
ρ − 1. If, instead, the consumer switches from S to D in the second period, the resulting
rate of change in consumption between the two periods is (δpP/qP )
1
ρ − 1, which is smaller
that the previous one for all qP > pP : consumption would then fall at a higher rate over the
month. To sum up, at high frequencies, the switch between different shopping regimes may
generate a significant drop in consumption of perishable goods, even if the consumer does
not suffer from self-control problems (i.e. she is an exponential discounter).
A couple of considerations can be made on this result. First, it crucially relies on the exis-
tence of implicit or explicit liquidity constraints, since otherwise there would be no reason
to stockpile the non-perishable food at payday, rather than in other days of the month.
Second, the change in the shopping regimes over the month represents a confounding factor
with respect to the identification of time preferences in consumption.
To see this, let assume to observe an heterogenous population which is randomly assigned
among the two periods of the month. The presence of consumers that switch between S and
D from the first to the second period of the month, then, results in a much lower average
fall in consumption between the two periods with respect to what would be if no shopping
choice was possible. If an analyst does not control for such a change in the shopping regime,
her estimate of the exponential discount factor may be downward biased. If, as Shapiro [61]
has done, the analyst tries to calibrate a hyperbolic (βδ) discount function, she may obtain
a more plausible result, but only because she is confounding the price ratio p/q with the
short-term discount factor β. For instance, calibrating the βδ model assuming log-utility
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(ρ = 1), Shapiro obtains β = 0.9 which is remarkably similar to the average ratio between
grocery and mass-merchandisers food prices reported by Fox [25].
Looking at a concave declining pattern, such as the one highlighted by Mastrobuoni and
Weinberg [51], seems a more robust identification strategy. However, the estimate of the
rate of change between different periods may still be biased downward. In addition, for any
ρ > 1, the condition to choose between one shopping regime or the other is highly non-linear.
If the perishable food must be purchased more than twice per month, then, the resulting
consumption pattern may be non-linear, and eventually concave.
Summing up, this simple and stylized model has two main empirical implications: first, liq-
uidity constrained households should display a monthly cycle in shopping behavior, going in
larger/farther shops at payday and in smaller/nearer shops afterwards; second, the shopping
cycle may explain part of the drop in consumption over the month identified by empirical
analyses. In the next Section, I bring the first prediction to the data.
2.6 Does the probability of shopping in a supermarket
display a monthly cycle?
To test the prediction of the theoretical model concerning the shopping behavior of liquidity
constrained consumers, I exploit information available for Homescan families on the place
in which each purchase has been performed. ACNielsen distinguishes between two main
types of shop: large supermarkets (and hyperstores) and small grocery shops. I define a
dummy equal to 1 if the household has performed at least one purchase in a supermarket in
that payweek. Most of the 67,250 payweeks in the sample (71%) have at least one purchase
performed in the supermarket/hyperstore, 36.36% of the paymonths have all five dummies
equal to 1, and 2.55% have all equal to zero. Thanks to this relatively large variability, it is
possible to study whether there exist a cycle in shopping behavior and, in particular, whether
the probability of shopping in larger supermarkets is significantly larger at the beginning of
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the month, as the model predicts.
Table 2.4 reports the results of several probability models. Specification 9 uses a linear
fixed-effect model, which controls for calendar effects and household unobserved heterogene-
ity; specification 10 is a simple probit model, with standard errors clustered at the household
level, and controls for calendar effects and household socio-demographic characteristics; coef-
ficients from a fixed effect logit estimate are reported in specification 11; results of a random
effect probit are reported in the last column. In all the possible specifications, there is a
significant drop in the probability of shopping in a supermarket/hyperstore after the first
week of the paymonth.
The model in the previous Section attributes this drop to the presence of liquidity con-
straints, that induces household to prefer paydays for rebuilding their stocks, since at that
time they have more cash-on-hands. It must be stressed, that such behavior may not only
be produced by explicit constraints, such as the inability to borrow against future income,
but even by implicit constraints, such as those produced by precautionary savings. Indeed,
in the presence of uncertainty over future disposable income (due to uncertainty over income
inflows, or over future compulsory expenditures) consumers may prefer to use cash rather
than credit to perform their monthly purchases.
For these reasons, I split the sample between liquidity constrained and unconstrained house-
holds (using one of the proxies considered in Section 2.4). Table 2.5 reports results of four
linear probability models applied to the young, old, less educated, and more educated house-
holds, respectively. Consistently with the predictions of the model, the drop is much more
prominent among household whose head is under 45 (-5% between the first and the last
payweek) with respect to the older ones (-1.6%), and among households whose head has
lower education (-6%) with respect to the more educated ones (-1.7%).
Since the price differentials between the two types of shops is significant (average price per
kilo for fresh fruits and vegetables is 10.2% lower in supermarkets than in small shops), this
shopping behavior may contribute to explain the paycycle in consumption. Thus, in the
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next Section, I try to estimate the paycycle net of the effect of the shopping cycle, to see
whether the results remain consistent with those obtained by previous studies.
2.7 Evidence of time-inconsistency?
I now test whether the ‘pure’ effect of time-preferences (controlling for the effect of the
shopping cycle) induces a significant drop in weekly consumption. This task is complicated
by the fact that it is reasonable to assume that choices of where to shop and of how much
to purchase are simultannous. Hence, simply adding the shopping dummy to models (2.1)
and (2.2) would yield biased results.
As an instrument for shopping decision, I use the price ratio between supermarkets and
small shops. For each household, I compute an estimate of the price faced in each type
of shop using the average price paid by households belonging to its province in that type
of shop. Formally the price faced by individual i belonging to province h in shop k =
{supermarket, smallshop} in paymonth t is defined as:
P kiht = E
(
P kjt|j ∈ h, j 6= i
)
(2.6)
The exogeneity of the resulting price ratio Rit = P
Super
iht /P
Small
iht relies on the assumption
that there are neither social interactions between sampled households belonging to the same
province. To obtain more precise estimates of (2.6), I focus on provinces where there are at
least thirty sampled households.
Table 2.6 reports the results of the reduced form estimates in which I inserted the log of Rit
directly as a control variable. Specification 17 estimates model (2.1) on all sample. The ratio
has a negative and highly significant effect: a 1% increase in the relative price of supermar-
kets decreases consumption by 0.24%. After controlling for this effect, however, consumption
is flatter over the month with respect to what was estimated before. Controlling for the price
ratio in model (2.2) yields similar results (estimates 18 and 19).
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Table 2.7 shows the 2SLS results on the effect of distance from payday net of the effect of
the shopping cycle. The shopping dummy has been instrumented using the price ratio. The
shopping dummy has a positive and significant effect on consumption: when the household
shops in a supermarket, its weekly consumption of fruits and vegetables increases by 37.6
percent with respect to when it shops only in small groceries. All the Payweek dummies
have very small coefficients which are not statistically different from zero at any conventional
level. Results are similar if I split the sample according to household head’s age and educa-
tion (columns 21 and 22, respectively): the paycycle is not present in any of the subgroups.
These findings can be considered at odds with the interpretation of the paycycle given by
previous studies. In the Italian Homescan sample, households do experience a significant
drop in consumption between paydays, consistently with results from US and UK, but this
fall is explained by the intra-monthly drop in the probability of shopping in the supermar-
ket/hyperstore and by the price differentials between this type of shop and small groceries.
2.8 Robustness checks
There may still be alternative explanations for the results provided. First, supermarket
and groceries may anticipate the cyclical behavior of consumers and implement an ad hoc
pricing strategy. Note, however, that what would be the resulting cycle in prices is not clear
ex ante. Standard models of perfect competition predict that price increases when demand
peaks, so that the prices would be pro-cyclical; however, existing evidence on grocery prices
show that they tend to decrease at seasonal peaks of demand, consistently with a ‘loss-
leader’ model of retail competition (Chevalier et al. [16]). A counter-cyclical price strategy
would induce a strengthening of the paycycle: since I do not find any intra-monhtly fall in
consumption (once I control for the shopping cycle), my result would be robust. On the
contrary, a standard pro-cyclical pricing would reduce the paycycle and may explain the flat
consumption pattern found. Finally, notice that paydays may be hard to infer, given the
variance in paycheque receipts highlighted in Section 2.3. Be as it may, an endogenous pricing
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strategy would ultimately make it impossible to identify time preferences, thus weakening the
interpretation given to previous findings. To test for the existence of any strategic pricing by
retailers, I study the intra-monthly cycle in price-per-kilo of fruits and vegetables purchased
by the households in the sample. It is important to stress that if retailers would implement a
cyclical pricing strategy, and if this strategy would have any effect on consumers’ behavior,
then we would observed changes in the price paid. Note, in addition, that prices analised are
effective, since they are net of any discount or sale, as stressed in Section 2.3. Specifications
23 and 24 of Table 2.8 show results of the estimate of the effect of distance since payday on
price-per-kilo, separately between small groceries and supermarkets/hyperstores. The fixed-
effect strategy controls for household unobserved heterogeneity and calendar effects, as usual.
For small shops, the mild reductions reported in the second and fourth payweeks are not
statistically significant, while for supermarkets even the point-estimate show an absolutely
flat pattern. I conclude that there are no evidence of strategic pricing by grocery shops and
supermarkets.
By focusing on paydays distributed over six days (i.e. the first payweek) I may have reduced
the precision of the estimate of the distance since the last income receipt. Specification 25
in Table 2.8 reports results of the model (2.1) on the sample of households whose paydays
are gathered in a single triplet of days: no significant paycycle emerges, after controlling for
the change in the shopping regime over the month.10
Finally, the analyses have focused on quantities of fresh fruits and vegetables, since this
represents the correct measure to identify consumption. Given that the paycycle emerges as
the effect of the price differentials, the model predicts that looking at weekly volumes of fresh
fruits and vegetables (i.e. quantity timed price) we would observe a flat pattern even without
controlling for the shopping cycle. Indeed, exponential consumers would increase quantities
purchased when they shop at the supermarket, so to maintain expenditures constant over
the month. I, therefore, study the effect of distance from payday on weekly volumes of fresh
10Similar results are obtained even splitting the sample between liquidity constrained and unconstrained
households.
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fruits and vegetables, estimating equation (2.1) without adding the shopping dummy. The
result, summarized in specification 26 of Table 2.8 is consistent with the model predictions,
showing no significant drop in expenditures between paydays.
2.9 Conclusions
Recent studies have produced evidence of a paycycle in intra-monthly consumption, and
have argued that this represents evidence of self-control problems among consumers. In this
paper, I have replicated previous results using a rich dataset collecting weekly data on food
expenditures and consumption. Consumption of highly perishable food significantly drops
by 3% between the beginning and the end of the paymonth. This effect is reinforced if we
look more closely at liquidity constrained households (as proxied by age or education of the
household head). Contrary to previous results, however, I show that this drop is largely
explained by the intra-monthly change in shopping behavior: households that are liquidity
constrained or have some degree of preference for purchasing out of cash rather than out of
credit, are more likely to shop in farther/cheaper stores at the beginning of the paymonth
to rebuild food stocks. The price differentials between these supermarkets and nearer/more
expensive shops where households continue to buy perishable food for the rest of the pay-
month determines a drop in the quantities purchased of this food category. This effect could
not be controlled for by previous analyses and may have biased previous estimates of time-
preferences toward the rejection of standard exponential discounting models. Consistenly
with this explanation, no paycycle emerges once I control for the change in the shopping
behavior. Robustness checks show no sign of strategic pricing and other confounding factors
that may have hampered my results.
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2.10 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
All Sample With Fixed PDay
Income
No. of Components
1 Comp. 7.73 8.43
(.60) (.60)
2 Comp. 21.28 22.23
(.90) (.90)
3 Comp. 28.79 29.76
(.99) (.99)
4 Comp. 32.68 31.84
(1.01) (1.01)
5 or more. 9.48 7.72
(.57) (.57)
Income
Deciles 1-2 22.39 18.69
(.84) (.84)
Deciles 3-5 30.30 29.76
(.99) (.99)
Deciles 6-8 31.12 33.72
(1.02) (1.02)
Deciles 9-10 16.18 17.80
(.83) (.83)
Head Age
Under 35 7.10 8.10
(.59) (.59)
35-44 31.51 33.58
(1.02) (1.02)
45-54 27.86 25.24
(.94) (.94)
55-64 22.48 22.09
(.90) (.90)
65 or more 11.02 10.97
(.67) (.67)
Education
Primary 6.64 5.88
(.51) (.51)
Secondary 25.41 24.11
(.92) (.92)
Tertiary 67.94 69.99
(.99) (.99)
Monthly Exp.
Tot. Grocery 368.7 375.29
(1.10) (1.80)
Fruits & Veg. 39.45 42.16
(.16) (.26)
No. of HHs 6,655 2,123
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. a: includes Sardinia.
Table 2.2: Effect of distance from payday on total weekly expenditures on grocery and fruits
& vegetables - all sample
Total Grocery Exp. Fruits & Vegetables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PayWeek 2 -0.001 0.003 0.008 0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
PayWeek 3 -0.072 -0.061 -0.038 -0.042
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)***
PayWeek 4 -0.077 -0.063 -0.028 -0.024
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)**
PayWeek 5 -0.073 -0.049 -0.032 -0.029
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)**
HH Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
Obs. 58589 58589 58589 58589
HHs. 2123 2123 2123 2123
Overall R2 .12 .22 .10 .25
ρ .39 .40 .51 .53
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard error in parentheses. Controls include calendar month, day of
the week, day of the month, holiday, and preholiday.
Table 2.3: Effect of distance from payday on total weekly expenditures on grocery and fruits
& vegetables - proxies of liquidity constraints
Young / Old Low / High Education
Tot. Grocery Fruits & Tot. Grocery Fruits &
Expenditures Vegetables Expenditures Vegetables
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Young Low Ed.
PayWeek 2 0.008 0.004 -0.032 -0.011
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014)** (0.017)
PayWeek 3 -0.059 -0.053 -0.108 -0.074
(0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.017)***
PayWeek 4 -0.064 -0.050 -0.131 -0.055
(0.011)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.018)***
PayWeek 5 -0.050 -0.053 -0.115 -0.062
(0.011)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.018)***
Old High Ed.
PayWeek 2 -0.001 0.026 0.021 0.022
(0.014) (0.016) (0.011)** (0.012)*
PayWeek 3 -0.062 -0.022 -0.038 -0.026
(0.014)*** (0.016) (0.010)*** (0.017)**
PayWeek 4 -0.062 0.016 -0.031 -0.010
(0.014)*** (0.017) (0.011)*** (0.013)
PayWeek 5 -0.049 0.007 -0.020 -0.014
(0.013)*** (0.017) (0.011)** (0.013)
HH FE & Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 58589 58589 58589 58589
HHs. 2123 2123 2123 2123
Overall R2 .12 .22 .10 .25
ρ .39 .40 .51 .53
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard error in parentheses. Controls include calendar month, day of
the week, day of the month, holiday, and preholiday.
Table 2.4: Effect of the distance from payday on the probability of shopping in the supermarket - all sample
Linear Probit FE Logit RE Probit
(9) (10) (11) (12)
PayWeek 2 -0.012 -0.041 -0.081 -0.045
(0.005)** (0.016)** (0.034)** (0.020)**
PayWeek 3 -0.039 -0.124 -0.252 -0.148
(0.006)*** (0.018)*** (0.035)*** (0.020)***
PayWeek 4 -0.034 -0.105 -0.218 -0.125
(0.006)*** (0.018)*** (0.035)*** (0.020)***
PayWeek 5 -0.034 -0.105 -0.216 -0.127
(0.005)*** (0.017)*** (0.034)*** (0.020)***
Household FE Yes No Yes No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 58589 58589 50681 58589
HHs. 2123 1987 2123
Log-Likelihood –30410.30 –34427.44 –26785.03 –31670.79
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. For the fixed effect specifications, controls include calendar month, day of the week, day
of the month, holiday, and preholiday. For the probit and random effect probit, the following controls are added: household
size, residential area, income group, head’s age and education.
Table 2.5: Effect of the distance from payday on the probability of shopping in the supermarket - linear prob. models
By Age By Education
Under 45 45 or More Low High
(13) (14) (15) (16)
PayWeek 2 0.003 -0.008 0.001 0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)*
PayWeek 3 -0.047 -0.019 -0.072 -0.012
(0.007)*** (0.009)** (0.010)*** (0.006)**
PayWeek 4 -0.040 -0.022 -0.046 -0.022
(0.007)*** (0.009)** (0.010)*** (0.006)***
PayWeek 5 -0.051 -0.016 -0.060 -0.017
(0.006)*** (0.009)* (0.010)*** (0.006)***
HH FE & Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 25295 41956 20435 46815
HHs. 820 1303 680 1443
Overall R2 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include calendar month, day of the week, day of the month, holiday,
preholiday, as well as household unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 2.6: Effect of distance from payday on total weekly expenditures on fruits & vegetables - controlling for the price ratio
All Sample Young / Old Low / High Education
(17) (18) (19)
Young Low Ed.
PayWeek 2 0.012 -0.001 0.004
(0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
PayWeek 3 -0.013 -0.002 -0.013
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
PayWeek 4 -0.005 -0.014 -0.016
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017)
PayWeek 5 -0.020 -0.026 -0.033
(0.011)* (0.013)* (0.017)*
Log Price -0.237 -0.351 -0.257
Ratio (0.106)*** (0.157)*** (0.124)**
Old High Ed.
PayWeek 2 0.004 0.011
(0.016) (0.015)
PayWeek 3 0.019 -0.020
(0.015) (0.015)
PayWeek 4 -0.008 -0.014
(0.016) (0.017)
PayWeek 5 -0.011 -0.016
(0.017) (0.015)
Log Price -0.214 -0.195
Ratio (0.102)** (0.095)***
HH FE & Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 55611 55611 55611
HHs. 1978 1978 1978
Overall R2 .17 .21 .18
ρ .32 .41 .42
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include calendar month, day of the week, day of the month, holiday, and
preholiday.
Table 2.7: Effect of distance from payday on total weekly expenditures on fruits & vegetables - controlling for the instrumented
shopping decision
All Sample Young / Old Low / High Education
(20) (21) (22)
Young Low Ed.
PayWeek 2 0.002 -0.005 -0.019
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018)
PayWeek 3 -0.011 0.000 0.007
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018)
PayWeek 4 0.006 0.010 0.022
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
PayWeek 5 -0.002 -0.013 -0.021
(0.016)* (0.015) (0.018)
Shopping 0.376 0.443 0.399
in Supermkt (0.183)** (0.210)** (0.191)**
Old High Ed.
PayWeek 2 -0.001 0.028
(0.018) (0.021)
PayWeek 3 0.012 -0.006
(0.017) (0.020)
PayWeek 4 0.010 -0.028
(0.018) (0.017)
PayWeek 5 -0.015 -0.000
(0.014) (0.019)
Shopping 0.303 0.340
in Supermkt (0.154)* (0.175)*
HH FE & Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 55611 55611 55611
HHs. 1978 1978 1978
Overall R2 .18 .19 .20
ρ .23 .27 .25
F-stat. of excl. instr. 13.62 11.01 10.5
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include calendar month, day of the week, day of the month, holiday, and
preholiday.
Table 2.8: Robustness checks: effect on prices; effect on quantities consumed using HHs with one payday; effect on volumes
of fruits and vegetables
Prices Fruits and Vegetables
Small Shops Supermarkets Payday Volumes
in 1 Triplet
(23) (24) (25) (26)
PayWeek 2 -0.038 -0.002 0.020 0.020
(0.034) (0.007) (0.025) (0.015)
PayWeek 3 -0.003 0.000 -0.023 -0.008
(0.034) (0.007) (0.027) (0.015)
PayWeek 4 -0.036 0.010 -0.005 -0.012
(0.035) (0.008) (0.027) (0.016)
PayWeek 5 0.003 0.011 -0.019 -0.014
(0.035) (0.008) (0.029) (0.016)
Shopping 0.341
in Supermkt (0.141)***
HH FE & Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2443 36366 29510 38809
HHs. 672 1510 1095 1515
Overall R2 0.09 0.04 0.21 0.20
ρ .62 .42 .41 .47
F-stat. of excl. instr. 12.10
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include calendar month, day of the week, day of the month, holiday,
preholiday, as well as household unobserved heterogeneity.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of payday over the month
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of payday over the month, by type of income
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Consumption during Recession.
Evidence of Liquidity Constraints and Time Inconsistency
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Abstract
I develop a test for the joint presence of liquidity constraints and time incon-
sistency. These phenomena can be identified by looking at how households smooth their
consumption between paydays when hit by a drop in available resources. Based on a large
panel of Italian households observed daily both before and during the crisis of 2008/09, I
show that households whose resources dropped in 2009 experienced a significant decline in
the growth rate of consumption since the fourth week after income receipt. This decline
is stronger for younger and less educated households. A generalized model of consumption
shows that differential changes in the intra-monthly growth rate of instantaneous consump-
tion is evidence of the presence of both liquidity constraints and self-control problems among
Italian households.
3.1 Introduction
The Great Recession of 2008/09 represents an unprecedented collective shock to household
welfare in most industrialized countries. In Europe in particular, households were hit by the
collapse of the real estate and financial markets, the tightening of bank loan policies, and an
increase in unemployment rates. Some first estimates for the UK show that the combined
effects of all these channels may sum up to an astounding loss of around 37,000 euros per
household,2 and estimates for Germany that consider only the loss of financial assets have
yielded an average loss of 4,000 euros per household.3 Although these figures are still highly
preliminary and should be taken with caution, it is clear that the recession has resulted into
a sudden negative shock to household resources.
I used this unique shock to jointly identify evidence of liquidity constraints and time incon-
sistency among consumers, by looking at how the crisis has changed the ability of households
to smooth their consumption in the period that separates two paydays (a “paymonth”).
Theory predicts that a time-consistent consumer will always display a constant growth rate of
consumption over a paymonth. Similar results are obtained for a time-inconsistent consumer
who has perfect access to capital markets. However, the combination of time inconsistency
and liquidity constraints results in a declining growth rate within the paymonth when the
consumer faces a drop in cash-on-hand. Thus, a significant drop in the growth rate of
consumption at the end of the paymonth signals the joint presence of binding liquidity con-
straints and time inconsistency.
To implement such a test, I exploited the ACNielsen Homescan panel, which collects in-
formation on daily food expenditures from a large sample of Italian households. The same
households are observed for several paymonths, both in 2007 and in the period of October
2008 to August 2009. Thus, it is possible to compare each household’s behavior before and
during the crisis. To study consumption using expenditure data, I focused on food categories
2Estimate by Halifax bank, cited by BBC ‘How every household lost 31,000 GBP ’, September 10, 2009.
Note that the large part of this loss is driven by the cut in the market value of all residential properties.
3‘Krise kostete Durchschnitts-Haushalt 4000 Euro’, Die Welt Online, May 11, 2009.
characterized by high perishability (fresh fruits and vegetables) and aggregate observations
at the weekly level. The impact of the recession on household income and assets is proxied
by the year-on-year monthly change in total real grocery expenditures between 2007 and
2009. Proxying drop in cash-on-hand with drops in total expenditures on grocery goods is
necessary because ACNielsen does not collect any reliable monthly measure of household
income and wealth. To the extent that the elasticity of grocery expenditures with respect
to income shocks is lower than one, however, this proxy is conservative.
I tested for the effect of a drop in household resources by estimating a triple differences model,
which controls for all confounding factors via fixed effects. I found that households hit by
a drop in total expenditures displayed a significant decline in the growth rate of consump-
tion of around 4.3% at the end of the paymonth. I looked for heterogeneity in the sample
by splitting it according to the head of the household’s age and education level. Younger
and less educated households displayed stronger declines when hit by the drop. In the latter
group, for example, the week-to-week growth rate in consumption was -8.3% in the last week
of the paymonth. This result may not be surprising, given that previous literature has found
these subgroups to be more likely to be liquidity constrained (Jappelli and Pistaferri [42]),
and that there is scattered laboratory evidence showing that time inconsistency is negatively
correlated with age and education (Tanaka et al [66]). Therefore, I built on this finding and
constructed a proxy of liquidity constraint: the probability of having difficulties in accessing
the credit market conditional on the full set of a household’s observed characteristics. To
construct such a proxy, I used the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW), which directly asks a representative sample of the Italian population a set of ques-
tions concerning their access to the credit market. Statistical matching between the SHIW
and the Homescan panel was then used to identify households that are likely to be liquidity
constrained.
I found that households belonging to the upper two deciles of this conditional probability dis-
tribution displayed increasing difficulties in smoothing consumption between paydays when
they face a reduction in cash-on-hand. On average, when total monthly expenditures de-
crease by 10% or more, consumption of perishable food fell by 18% between the first and the
last week of the paymonth (i.e. the month between two paydays). Households that are less
likely to be liquidity constrained displayed no similar pattern. Thus, conditional on being
liquidity constrained, I was able to identify time inconsistency among Italian households.
Finally, I extended the test by considering the drop in total grocery expenditures as a con-
tinuous treatment and estimating the dose-response function by means of the Generalized
Propensity Score technique developed by Hirano and Imbens [34]. I checked the robustness of
my finding by considering the following alternative explanations: strategic pricing by grocery
stores, cyclical shopping behavior, changes in household composition, and intra-household
competition for resources can be either ruled out or controlled for.
This research is connected to several strands in the literature and represents an improvement
over them in several respects. First, it connects to the huge empirical literature on excess
sensitivity of consumption to income shocks (see Browning and Lusardi [10] and Jappelli
and Pistaferri [42] for extensive reviews). Despite tests of excess sensitivity having been
performed for more than thirty years to date, results in this area are still mixed (Alegre and
Pou [3]). One of the main empirical challenges that must be faced is the identification of
clearly predictable, transitory, and exogenous income inflows. The present research improves
on the existing literature by looking at the monthly payday, which is a perfect candidate in
this respect (Stephens Jr. [62]).
Second, I used field evidence to contribute to the growing empirical literature documenting
the existence of self-control problems in intertemporal choices (DellaVigna [22]). Some re-
cent empirical works have tried to identify rejections of the rational expectations-permanent
income hypothesis (RE-PIH) using daily or weekly consumption data. Stephens Jr. [62] was
among the first of these. He used information from the 1986-1996 US Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey (CEX) to identify a monthly cycle in daily expenditures on instant-consumption
goods (e.g., leisure, food out of home, fresh fruits and vegetables, milk) for Social Security
recipients (who, at the time, were paid on the 3rd of the month). He found that pur-
chases of this category of goods peaks significantly right after payday.4 Mastrobuoni and
Weinberg [52] repeated his analysis using data from the 1997-2007 CEX (when the timing
of Social Security receipts changed) and found no sizeable monthly peak in expenditures,
however. Shapiro [61] studied the behavior of food stamps recipients and showed that their
caloric intake decreases markedly after the food stamps arrive. Calibrating an exponential
and a quasi-hyperbolic model of intra-monthly consumption, he showed that the latter fits
the data better. Mastrobuoni and Weinberg [51] focused on Social Security recipients and
showed that low-wealth individuals display a concave declining pattern in intra-monthly
consumption. Using a model that studies consumption allocation within one single month,
they showed that such a cycle linked to paydays (which they called a paycycle) can be ex-
plained by the introduction of quasi-hyperbolic preferences. These studies suffer from two
shortcomings, however.
First, the theoretical model used to distinguish between exponential and hyperbolic dis-
counting considers only the allocation within one month; the agent receives income at the
beginning of the month and has to consume everything by the end of it. This not only
implies liquidity constraints, but also rules out the possibility of the consumer saving from
one month to the other. As shall be seen later, relaxing this hypothesis yields different
predictions. Second, and most important, in Manaresi [49] I demonstrated that there may
have been a relevant confounding factor that biased all of the previous results toward the
rejection of exponential discounting. In short, liquidity constrained households may display
a cycle in shopping behavior; they may shop in larger supermarkets right after payday to
rebuild stocks of food and in smaller/nearer stores during the rest of the month to purchase
perishable food. In this case, any estimate of the discount factor that does not control for the
price differential between these two types of shops may have been biased downward, and the
4Stephens [63] extends this analysis to the UK case and confirms his previous results.
existence of the paycycle may have been erroneously attributed to hyperbolic discounting.5
The present research overcomes both these shortcomings: the theoretical model provides a
more realistic treatment of exponential and hyperbolic discounting at high-frequencies, and
the empirical estimate controls for intra-monthly shopping behavior.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces a simple theoreti-
cal model of intertemporal consumption in discrete-time that allows me to pinpoint the main
differences between exponential and hyperbolic consumers at high-frequency and the role of
liquidity constraints. Section 3.3 sets out the empirical framework. Section 3.4 presents
the dataset used and the strategies adopted to identify consumption, paydays, and drops
in cash-on-hand. Section 3.5 presents the main econometric analysis and its main results,
as well as robustness checks. Section 3.6 presents two extensions of the main econometric
model: a continuous treatment analysis and a test of time-consistency conditional on being
liquidity constrained. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 A simple theory of consumption between paydays
Consider the problem faced by a consumer who receives a stochastic income yt ∼ F (y)
every four periods (i.e. every four weeks) and has to allocate that income to maximize her
intertemporal utility function.6
max
ct∈C
U(t) = u(ct) +
T−t∑
τ=1
D(τ)u(ct+τ ) (3.1)
s.th.
yt =


f(y) if t = 4k + 1 k ∈ N
0 otherwise
5The shopping cycle may represent a more significant confounding factor for studies based on food ex-
penditures, [52] [62] [63], rather than on caloric intake [51] [61]. I thank Giovanni Mastrobuoni for raising
this point.
6Here, I assume that, in the short term, monthly income is constant up to a white noise multiplicative
transitory shock. A more general case, in which the income process has both permanent and transitory
shocks is considered in the appendix.
At = R(At−1 − ct−1 + yt−1)
where At is a perfectly liquid asset in week t and R is the gross interest rate, which is
assumed to be constant overtime. Cash-on-hand is defined as the sum of assets and the
present income flow: Xt = At + yt, and lifetime wealth is the sum of cash-on-hand and
the discounted value of future income flows: Wt = Xt +
∑T−t
τ=1 R
−τEtyt+τ . Define a shock
to resources St as the difference between the actual realization of income and its expected
value: St = yt − E(yt). Finally, let T →∞, to avoid end-of-time effects.
In the problem depicted in (3.1), no assumptions have been made on the instantaneous
budget constraint, C, and the discount function, D(t). I use this general specification to
obtain four possible cases: the consumer can be liquidity constrained or unconstrained, and
she can be time-consistent or inconsistent.
If the consumer has perfect access to capital markets, then C = [0,Wt] (Hall [31]). If, instead,
she is liquidity constrained, then C = [0, Xt] (Deaton [18]). Time-consistency is obtained
by assuming that the discount function is exponential: D(τ) = δτ . Finally, I model time
inconsistency by assuming that the discount function is quasi-hyperbolic (Laibson [45]):7
D(τ) =


1 if τ = 0
βδτ if τ > 0
Interest relies on the consumption pattern between paydays, i.e. between 4k+1 and 4k+5.
Here, I focus on a simple case that assumes δ = R = 1, a CRRA utility function of the type
u(•) = •1−ρ/(1− ρ), and a normally distributed income process (yt ∼ N(µ, σ
2)). A general
analysis of this model is provided in the online appendix:8 the qualitative results remain
unchanged even in more complex settings.
Consider a month of life for with infinite lifespan. The subscript w = {1, . . . , 4} is now used,
instead of t, to signal the four weeks of the month. At the beginning of the month, w = 1,
7Other models of self-control problems, such as Gul and Pesendorfer [30] or Fudenberg and Levine [26]
yield results that are qualitatively identical.
8Available at http://www2.dse.unibo.it/francesco.manaresi/LiqConsTestApp1.pdf.
the consumer has assets at their long-term expected value. I study the effect of two possible
transitory shocks: a weakly positive and a negative one (S1 ≥ 0 and S1 < 0).
Case 1: Perfect access to capital markets and time-consistency
These assumptions define the standard RE-PIH case. Temporary shocks in income are per-
fectly smoothed out by accessing capital markets. Thus, consumption stays constant within
the month both when S1 ≥ 0 and when S1 < 0.
Case 2: Perfect access to capital markets and time inconsistency
This case, which corresponds to the Laibson [45] model without illiquid assets, results in
consumption following the Euler equation:
u′(cw) = Ew
[
1 + (β − 1)
∂cw+1
∂Ww+1
]
u′(cw+1) (3.2)
It is straightforward that even in this case consumption should not react to
any transitory income shock. Indeed, for T large enough (i.e., if the end-of-time is not near),
the discount factor is constant overtime because the effect of the temporary shock on total
lifetime resources becomes negligible. Formally, ∂Wt/∂St → 0 as T − t → ∞, and thus
the rate of change in consumption is constant over time. Note, however, that while in the
time-consistent case the pattern was flat, here the pattern is declining at a constant rate for
any β < 1.
Case 3: Liquidity constraints and time-consistency
The consumer can only smooth out transitory shocks by dissaving Aw. Thus, income fluc-
tuations between months are partially tracked by consumption. In particular, when the
negative shock is strong enough to let liquidity constraints bind, the optimal strategy is to
dissave all resources and consume them all within the end of the month (i.e.,
∑4
w=1 c
∗
w = X1,
where the asterisk signals the optimal consumption level at week w). In these four periods
time-consistency assures that the consumption pattern is constant and (given the parameter
assumptions) perfectly flat. Thus, no paycycle emerges both in case S1 ≥ 0 and S1 < 0.
Case 4: Liquidity constraints and time inconsistency
Between paydays, consumption follows the Generalized Euler equation (Harris and Laib-
son [32]):
u′(cw) = Ew
[
1 + (β − 1)
∂cw+1
∂Xw+1
]
u′(cw+1) . (3.3)
In the appendix, I show that for nonbinding liquidity constraints, ∂cw+1
∂Xw+1
is ultimately con-
stant, and thus the discount factor is expected to be constant within the month for S1 ≥ 0.
Now consider the case of a negative shock, S1 < 0, such that the liquidity constraint is
binding. In this case, it is optimal to set
∑4
w=1 c
∗
w = X1. Defining the optimal consumption
in each week c∗w = αwXw (with α4 = 1) and using (3.3), it is easy to obtain the following:
c∗w =
αw+1
(1 + (β − 1)αw+1)
1
ρ + αw+1
Xw (3.4)
Inserting the condition for w = 4 and solving backward we obtain the following:
c∗w =
∏w
s=2 (4− s+ 1)β
1
ρ∏w
s=1
[
1 + β
1
ρ (4− s)
]X1 (3.5)
Taking logs and differencing between week w − 1 and week w, we obtain the growth rate of
consumption:
γw ≡ ∆ ln c
∗
w =
1
ρ
ln β −
1
4− w + 1
+
1
(4− w) + β−
1
ρ
(3.6)
which is the result obtained by Huffman and Barenstein [36] and Mastrobuoni and Wein-
berg [51]. It is easy to see that, for any β < 1, ∂γw/∆w < 0 (i.e., that the growth rate
decreases over the month).
The four results obtained are summarized in Figure 3.1. It simulates the within-month con-
sumption pattern of an infinite-lifespan agent in two cases: (i) no shocks and resources equal
to their expected value, and (ii) a negative shock in income that reduces initial resources
by two standard deviations of their long-term expected value. In the upper-left panel, the
consumer has perfect access to capital and is time-consistent (Case 1); in such a setting, the
two consumption patterns are identical and constant over the paymonth. The upper-right
figure represents Case 2, with time-consistency and liquidity constraints. Consumption is
reduced by the negative shock, but the intra-monthly growth rate of consumption remains
constant. The lower-left panel assumes time inconsistency and no liquidity constraints (Case
3); the overall pattern is declining (because the discount factor is now equal to β < 1) but
constant. Finally, in the last figure, liquidity constraints and time inconsistency are both
present (Case 4); the shock results in both a drop in monthly consumption and a change in
the intra-monthly shape of the curve, which now is concave and declining, following (3.6).
Thus, if we are able to identify the growth rate of consumption between paydays in the
presence of an income shock, we may identify the joint presence of liquidity constraints and
time inconsistency by testing the null of γw−1 = γw. The empirical strategy for doing so is
outlined in the next section.
3.3 Empirical model
Consider a random sample of consumers, indexed by i = {1, . . . , N}, whose weekly consump-
tion is observed for two years y = {2007, 2009} and for mit = {1, . . . ,M} paymonths in each
year. ∆w log ciwmy is the growth rate of consumption in week w of paymonth m in year y
for individual i. In 2009, a subset of households faces a drop in cash-on-hand Ximy in some
paymonths. Let Sim = 1 (lnXim2 − lnE(Xim) < 0) be a dummy equal to 1 if the consumer i
has been affected by this drop in paymonth m. The effect of Sim on the weekly growth rate
of consumption can be estimated using the following triple-differences model:
∆w log ciwmy = aiwm+SimWeekβ+d2009Weekpi+d2009SimWeekγ+d2009gi+εiwmy (3.7)
where aiwm is a consumer-week-paymonth specific fixed effect that encompasses individual
unobserved time-preferences, Week is a vector of payweek dummies, d2009 is a dummy
that takes value 1 in 2009, gi is a household specific change in the weekly growth rate of
consumption between 2007 and 2009, and εiwmy is the error term.
Note that the parameters of interest are the vector γ, which represent the effect of a drop
in cash-on-hand on the growth rate of consumption, defined by equation (3.6). The three
differences in model (3.7) are: the one between paymonths affected and not affected by a
drop in resources, the one between 2007 and 2009, and finally the household specific trend
between the two years gi.
Alternatively, one may impose gi = g for all i, to obtain a standard difference-in-differences
estimate. However, the common trend assumption (Angrist and Pischke [4]) necessary for
causal identification in a diff-in-diff model may not hold in this case: households affected and
not affected by the crisis may not display the same counter-factual change in log ciwm between
2007 and year 2009. First, changes in time preferences may be correlated with exposure to
a drop in cash-on-hand; consumers who have become more impatient, for example, may
have dissaved resources, thus being more likely to become liquidity constrained. Second,
there may be unobserved changes in household characteristics that affect both intertemporal
consumption and the propensity to be hit by the crisis. Third, there may be changes in
intertemporal prices at the local level that correlate with the exposure to the crisis. For
instance, the effective interest rate faced by consumers may increase more than proportionally
in areas negatively affected by the crisis.
Allowing for a household-specific change in the growth rate over the years overcomes all
these possible confounding factors, and allows me to test (i) whether changes in the growth
rate of consumption in week w have been affected by the shock (using the null-hypothesis:
piw = γw), and (ii) if the effect of the drop Sim increases over the paymonth (with the null:
γh = γj for h 6= j).
3.4 Data and identification strategies
The ACNielsen Homescan panel collects daily information on expenditures on grocery goods
from a representative sample of Italian households.9 Households are equipped with a portable
scanner with which they are asked to scan the barcode of each grocery packaged good
purchased. Barcodes are then matched by ACNielsen with a dataset of retail store prices
called ScanTrack. As a result, ACNielsen collects information on the quantity and quality of
each good purchased, as well as its effective price (i.e. price paid net of eventual discounts
due to promotions, sales, or coupons). For goods that do not have a barcode, households
must compile a daily diary in which they report both the quantity and the price paid.
Households provide some demographic information: their size, their province of residence,
and the household head’s age and education.10
Data was provided by ACNielsen for two different periods: January-December 2007 and
October 2008-August 2009. The former corresponds to a pre-crisis period, while the latter
(which for convenience will be named simply “2009”) spans from the financial collapse of
late 2008 to the core of the recession in 2009.
The panel dimension of the Homescan dataset is large: out of 6,655 households participating
in 2007, 64.1% (4,266) were participating even in 2009.
3.4.1 Identification of payday
To identify paydays, a questionnaire was administered on April 2009 by ACNielsen, asking
each individual in a household whether he or she receives a monthly wage or pension and
if so in which day of the calendar month. The latter information was obtained with three-
days detail (i.e., available answers were “from the 1st to the 3rd of the month”, “from the
9Representativeness is guaranteed by the use of sample weights. Since these weights have not been
disclosed by ACNielsen, I prepared an ex-post weighting based on the SHIW dataset, to obtain national
representativeness.
10There is even an income measure but its use is problematic. First, it is coarse (a 4-values categorical
variable); second, it is a measure of relative income, updated periodically; third, some robustness checks
have been performed (such as correlations with education or age groups) and have questioned its reliability.
4th to the 6th”, . . . , and “from the 28th to the 30th/31st”).11 For a thorough discussion
of the distribution of paydays over the month, see Manaresi [49]. Among the households
that participated both in 2007 and 2009, the response rate for the payday questionnaire was
63.2%, and 90.5% of the households who responded provided at least one payday. Thus, I
had information on paydays for 2,705 households who provided information both in 2007
and 2009.
I divided each paymonth into five groups of six days each, which I call ‘payweeks’. A
paymonth was thus composed of five payweeks, from the first (which contained the payday)
to the fifth (which preceded the subsequent payday).12
Although the vast majority of households (65.95%) had paydays concentrated in a single
triplet of days, there are as many as 921 households whose paydays were spread in more
than one triplet. To precisely identify the paycycle, however, I restricted my attention to
households whose paydays were, at best, spread among two subsequent triplets (that is,
within one payweek). This restriction reduced my sample to 2,034 households. Households
usually do not participate for all twelve months of the year; sometimes, for holidays or
other reasons, they stop sending information to ACNielsen. Since my goal was to compare
expenditure behaviors for the same households in the same weeks of the year between 2007
and 2009, I focused on paymonths for which the household provided information both in
2007 and in 2009. This restriction excluded 10 additional households. Finally, to control for
the household-specific trend of model (3.7) I had to restrict the sample to household who
had been both treated and untreated. The resulting sample is composed of 1,832 households
and a total of 14,572 paymonths.
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the overall sample of 2007 and for the subsample
on which I performed the econometric analysis, using ex-post sampling weights as described
11This restriction was the result of space availability in the questionnaire and of the way in which informa-
tion was collected: the families had to use the portable scanner to ‘scan’ their desired answer. As a result,
each possible answer had a specific barcode, and this increased the space needed. ACNielsen considered the
three-day aggregation to be the only feasible solution.
12Aggregation at the payweek level was used to identify consumption: see next paragraph.
in note 9. In the subsample, there are fewer households from southern Italy, and more from
the northeastern regions. Single households are over-represented, and households whose head
is age 65 or older are under-represented.
3.4.2 Identification of consumption
The Homescan panel collects information on purchases, but this paper focuses on the analysis
of household consumption. The difference between the two can be substantial (Aguiar and
Hurst [1]), particularly at high frequencies. Indeed, most of the items that are part of the
consumption basket can be bought once and stored for several days or weeks. Thus, a peak
in food expenditures may not signal any self-control problem, assuming that households shop
at the beginning of the month and then smooth consumption at home. To overcome this
problem and identify consumption through data on purchases, I used two strategies. First,
I focused on a food category characterized by high perishability: fresh fruits and vegetables.
Second, I aggregated data at the payweek level. The assumption, then, is that in an interval
of six days, consumption and expenditure practically coincide for this kind of perishable good.
3.4.3 Identification of drops in cash-on-hand
An additional problem that must be addressed is the identification of drops in cash-on-hand
similar to those outlined in the theoretical model. Ideally, we would like to observe income
received and assets owned in 2007 and 2009 for each paymonth. Unfortunately, there is no
reliable measure of income in the Homescan dataset, and ACNielsen does not collect any
data on household wealth. What I did have, however, was the monthly total expenditure on
grocery goods (i.e., food, beverages, and home-care goods). To the extent that this aggre-
gate correlates with total resources available, I could calculate the paymonth-on-paymonth
percentage change in grocery expenditures from 2007 to 2009 and use it as a proxy of drops
in cash-on-hands.13
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of real drops in total grocery expenditure for each pay-
month and for each household in the weighted sample between 2007 and 2009. The mean
value is 0.012, with a variance of .17. The distribution is moderately right-skewed with fat
tails (sample skewness and kurtosis are .38 and 2.91, respectively). Some additional remarks
are needed here.
First, the vast empirical literature on Engel’s law shows that a correlation between to-
tal financial resources (income and wealth) and food expenditures indeed exists. However,
the variance in food expenditures is usually less pronounced than that of income because
marginal utility gains from food consumption are decreasing in overall resources. As a re-
sult, my measure of resources drop can be considered conservative. This conservatism should
ultimately bias the result toward the rejection of any sizable effect.
Second, a variation in total food expenditure can be due to other confounding factors, such as
a change in household characteristics and composition or a change in residential area. These
confounding factors are relevant because they may even change the shape of consumption
within the paymonth (for example, an increase in household size may change the optimal
intertemporal consumption pattern markedly). In a standard difference-in-differences ap-
proach, one could control for these changes by including observable sociodemographic char-
acteristics provided by ACNielsen among the regressors. In the model (3.7), instead, the
additional household fixed-effect wipes out these possible confounding factors.
3.5 Empirical analysis
In this section, I estimate the effect of a drop in cash-on-hand on the weekly growth rate of
consumption γw. I first start with full sample estimate of (3.7). The results show a significant
negative effect in the last two payweeks of the paymonth. I then analyze the heterogeneity
13Total expenditures have been adjusted with the regional CPA index calculated for similar aggregates by
the National Statistical Institute.
of the effect, splitting the sample by age and by education of the household head. The drop
appears to be particularly strong among younger and less educated households. Since the
test allows for the joint identification of liquidity constraints and time inconsistency, the
results can be considered consistent with the previous literature, which has traditionally
considered these subgroups to be more likely to be liquidity constrained. Finally, I test the
robustness of my findings against several possible alternative explanations and reject all of
them.
3.5.1 Baseline regression
For each payweek of the paymonth, I estimated the model (3.7). The estimates controlled
for calendar effects via appropriate dummies. The dummies included the day of the calen-
dar month and the day of the calendar week in which the payweek starts, calendar month
dummies, and dummies controlling for whether there has been a holiday or a pre-holiday in
the payweek.
Results are summarized in Table 3.2. The standard errors are clustered at the household
level. The pi parameters represent the change in weekly growth rate of consumption ex-
perienced between 2007 and 2009 in paymonths not characterized by a drop in resources
(the control group). None of these coefficients are statistically different from zero, showing
that the consumption pattern has ultimately remained constant. The γ parameters, instead,
represent the difference between paymonths affected by a drop in resources and the control
group. When total expenditures on grocery goods drop, the growth rate of consumption
declines in the first payweek by 4.6% (i.e., consumption drops with respect to the previous
paymonth). In payweeks 2 and 3, instead, there is no significant effect of a drop in resources.
Finally, for payweeks 4 and 5 there is a significant drop in the growth rate, of a similar
magnitude with respect to the effect on payweek 1.
Figure 3.2 depicts the consumption patterns implied by results of model (3.7). The drop in
resources clearly generates both a decline in the level of consumption and a change in the
within-paymonth consumption pattern.
These first results represent evidence of the joint presence of liquidity constraints and time
inconsistency in the sample. An estimate of β out of γ crucially relies on some assumptions
about the CRRA coefficient ρ. For example, if we allow ρ = 1 (log-utility), using (3.6) we
obtain an estimated short-term discount factor β slightly lower than 0.97. This result is
however an upper bound, because it implicitly relies on the assumption that all households
for which a drop in total expenditures is observed are both time-inconsistent and liquidity
constrained. This assumption may not hold, however, and time-preferences and liquidity
constraints may be heterogeneous in the population.
3.5.2 Heterogeneity and liquidity constraints
In general, access to credit markets can be expected to be highly heterogeneous among the
population. The availability of collateral is usually correlated with sociodemographic char-
acteristics, and the desire to access credit markets usually depends on one’s expectations
about future income streams. Indeed, a large empirical literature has shown that liquidity
constraints are usually negatively correlated with household wealth, age, and education level
(Jappelli [40], Browning and Lusardi [10], Jappelli and Pistaferri [42]).
In addition, more recent evidence has shown that low wealth is correlated with myopic behav-
iors in intertemporal consumption (Aguiar and Hurst [1], Mastrobuoni and Weinberg [51]).
Although in this case the direction of causality cannot be easily identified ex ante,14 this
correlation represents an additional factor pointing to the existence of possible heterogeneous
effects behind the full sample estimate.
On the basis of the previous literature and the data availability, I stratify the estimate of
the change between 2007 and 2009 for treated and control paymonths by age, interacting
the payweek dummies with a group dummy for households younger than 45 years old, and
by education level, interacting with a dummy =1 if the household’s head has no more than
14Indeed, on one hand time inconsistency may result in lower saving rates (Laibson et al. [46]), while on the
other hand lower wealth may allow time inconsistency to be better identified, as was previously discussed.
a lower secondary education.
The results for splitting based on the head’s age are summarized in Table 3.3. For younger
households, the estimated γw is usually lower, particularly in the 1st, 4th and 5th payweeks.
Specifically, when the household is hit by a drop in resources, consumption drops by 5.7% in
the first payweek, by 3.7% between the 3rd and the 4th payweek and by 6.7% between the
4th and the 5th. For households whose head is 45 or older, instead, the drop is significant
only for the 5th payweek (at which time it is 3.9%).
Splitting by the head’s education (Table 3.4) yields more marked differences; for less edu-
cated households, the drop is 6.1% in the first payweek (with respect to the fifth payweek
of the previous paymonth), 3.2% at the third payweek (but it is significant only at the 10%
level), and increases in the fourth and fifth payweek to 4.6% and 8.9%, respectively. House-
holds with upper secondary education or more, by contrast, do not display any significant
drop when they experience a drop in monthly resources.
3.5.3 Robustness checks
I now consider possible alternative explanations for the results obtained.
First, the decline in consumption within the paymonth may be explained by the shopping
cycle. Indeed, as discussed in Manaresi [49], households display a shopping cycle over the
paymonth: going to larger/cheaper stores when they receive income and in smaller and
more expensive ones later in the month. This cycle can be explained by the trade-off between
proximity and convenience (Bell et al. [7]). Since a change in the marginal price can result in
a drop in the quantities of highly perishable food consumed between paydays, the shopping
cycle represents a relevant confounding factor in any estimate of time-preferences using
consumption data at high frequency. In the present analysis, in particular, the relevance of
the shopping cycle stems from the fact that a reduction in available resources may affect the
decision about where to shop inasmuch as how much to eat. To control for this confounding
factor, I exploit two strategies.
First, I compute the ratio between prices paid in the supermarkets and prices paid in smaller
shops for each household i, paymonth m, year y: Rimy = P
Super
imy /P
Small
imy (using the average
price paid in both types of shops by households sampled in the same province of i, see
Manaresi [49]). This ratio is then interacted with the payweek dummies and with the year
dummy:
∆w log ciwmy = aiwm + SimWeekβ + d2009Weekpi + d2009SimWeekγ
+Rim,2007Weekδ1 + d2009Rim,2009Weekδ2 + d2009gi + εiwmy (3.8)
the resulting γ parameters can be thought of as estimating the effect of a drop in resources
Sim on the weekly growth rate of consumption net of the potential effect of switching be-
tween different types of shops (i.e., the effect of the price gain/loss incurred by switching
from supermarket to smaller shop or vice-versa). As a second strategy, I use the interactions
between the price ratio Rimy and the payweek dummies as instruments for the decision to
shop in a supermarket rather than in a small shop in each payweek (defined by a dummy
Siwmy equal to 1 if the household has performed at least one trip to a supermarket/hyperstore
in payweek w of paymonth m in year y, and equal to zero otherwise).
Panel A of Table 3.5 summarizes the result of controlling for the price ratio directly, while
Panel B shows the estimated pi and γ coefficients when I controlled for the decision to shop
in a supermarket vis-a`-vis a small shop. Because I need to observe several households in the
same province in order to compute the price ratio (I consider 30 households as the threshold),
the sample is further reduced to 1,480 households for which we observe a total of 10,672 com-
plete paymonths both in 2007 and in 2009. The estimates become slightly less precise, due
to the combined effect of a smaller sample and a larger number of regressors. Nonetheless,
the effect of a drop in cash-on-hand remains significant and negative in the fifth payweek of
the month.
An alternative possible explanation of declining consumption within the paymonth is intra-
household competition for resources (Shapiro [61], Mastrobuoni and Weinberg [51]). If house-
hold members compete for the same resources non-cooperatively, then they have an incentive
to consume all they can when resources are first available. This strategic behavior can result
in a declining consumption profile at the household level, even if its members are exponential
discounters. Moreover, the struggle within the household is likely to become stronger as re-
sources get scarcer, and this may explain the effect of the negative drop. However, this effect
should vanish among single households, so we can check whether the previous results hold
even among that subgroup. The upper panel of Table 3.5 reports the results of estimating
(3.7) for single households only. Since the sample size decreases markedly, the coefficient
estimates become less precise. Nonetheless, there is still a significant fall in the consumption
slope in the last two payweeks which cannot be explained by intra-household competition.
The declining consumption profile may signal the effect of unexpected increases in payments
at the end of the month. If the household cannot borrow to honor such payments, it may
have to decrease consumption in response. This effect can generate both a reduction in
total monthly expenditure and an intra-monthly fall in consumption, even if the consumer is
time-consistent. To exclude this possible alternative explanation, I focused on the drops in
total grocery expenditure in the first two payweeks of the paymonth. Panel B of Table 3.5
reports estimate of the model in (3.7) with deciles computed over the distribution of drops
in total expenditures in the first two weeks of the paymonth. The resulting pattern is very
similar to the one in Table 3.2, showing that the role of intra-monthly shocks in resources is
negligible.
Finally, drops in consumption of highly perishable food may result from cyclical pricing by
groceries. Indeed, if groceries increase prices at the end of the paymonth, and consumers are
not able to identify this pricing strategy, they may end up decreasing their consumption at
the end of the month. Panels C and D look at the growth rate of the price per kilo of fruits
and vegetables paid by the consumers, distinguishing between supermarket/hypermarkets
and small groceries. None of these rates are significantly different from zero, a result which
is inconsistent with the existence of cyclical pricing.
3.6 Extensions
In this section I consider two extensions to the empirical analysis performed. First, I develop
a direct measure of the probability of being liquidity constrained, conditional on observed
household characteristics, and test whether there is evidence of time inconsistency among
households that are more likely to have difficulties in accessing credit markets. Second, I
consider the drop in cash-on-hand as a continuous treatment and estimate the dose-response
functions for each payweek.
3.6.1 Testing for the effect of the drop among liquidity constrained
households
While the test in the previous section allowed for the joint identification of liquidity con-
straints and time inconsistency, I now identify the latter conditioning on the former. In
order to identify liquidity constraints, I followed Guiso et al. [29] and used a survey in which
difficulties in accessing credit markets are directly elicited from the questionnaire. I then
calculated the conditional probability of being liquidity- constrained based on a set of co-
variates and performed statistical matching between the survey and the Homescan dataset.
To calculate the conditional probability of being liquidity constrained, I used the 2006 Bank
of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The SHIW identifies liquidity
constrained households among a representative sample of the Italian population using a
set of precise questions. Households are asked whether they have been denied credit or
discouraged from borrowing.15 Out of 7,768 households in the sample, 308 (3.96%) can
be considered liquidity constrained, which corresponds, using sample weights, to 5.4% of
15The questions are: ‘C48. During 2006, did you or your family apply for a loan?’ If yes ⇒ ‘C49. Was
your application accepted?’ If no ⇒ ‘C51. Did you consider applying for a loan but then changed your
mind, since you expected it to be denied?’. See Jappelli [40] for a discussion on the use of direct questions
to identify liquidity constrained consumers.
the Italian population. On the basis of this information, I estimated the probability that
households are liquidity constrained conditional on a vector of household characteristics,
Pr(dL = 1|Zi = z). I then used this estimate, to attribute a probability of being liquidity
constrained to the households that are part of the Homescan dataset, conditional on their
sociodemographic characteristics. This procedure is valid as long as the SHIW estimate can
be considered representative of the Italian situation and as long as the characteristics of the
credit-constrained households did not vary substantially in Italy between 2006 and 2009.16
Table 3.6 reports the results of the probit model used to estimate the conditional probabil-
ity of being liquidity constrained. All of the coefficients have signs consistent with similar
reports in the literature (Jappelli et al. [41]); liquidity constraints are more common among
younger households and those whose head is less educated and increase with household size.
All the other covariates (e.g., being headed by a male or having an unemployed household
head) have the expected sign, although they are not statistically significant.
Conditional probabilities for the Homescan households were then calculated by using the
probit coefficients. The resulting distribution of Pr(dL = 1|Zi = z) is depicted in Figure
3.4. I considered the deciles of this distribution and interacted the payweek dummies in the
baseline DDD model with deciles dummies. Therefore, it was possible to obtain, for each
week of the paymonth, estimates of the effects of the drop in cash-on-hand on the growth
rates of consumption for households belonging to each decile of the distribution. The results
of this exercise are summarized in Table 3.7. The drop has a significant and negative effect
only for households belonging to the ninth and tenth deciles (that is, the 20% who are more
likely to be liquidity constrained). For the highest decile, in particular, consumption drops
by 8.1 percentage points in the fifth payweek, and by 4.6 in the fourth. To the extent that
the proxy for liquidity constraints correctly identifies difficulties in accessing credit markets,
the liquidity constrained households present clean evidence of time inconsistency.
16The period 2000-2006 was characterised by an increase in financial depth, while the global crisis has
created a tightening in credit policies. If anything, the share of households that were liquidity constrained
in 2006 is a lower bound with respect to the level in 2009.
3.6.2 Continuous treatment
So far, the treatment variable has been dichotomous: equal to 1 if there was a negative
growth rate in real grocery expenditure between the same paymonths of 2007 and 2009 and
0 otherwise. As a final assessment, I studied the effect of the growth rate of real grocery
expenditure as a continuous treatment. The theoretical support of a growth rate is [−1,∞);
in practice, as shown in Figure 3.3, the empirical support of the treatment is [−1, 1.5], and the
distribution is highly concentrated over the median. Let SCiwm be the continuous treatment
variable. To estimate the dose-response function for each value of the treatment, I used the
Generalized Propensity Score. I modified the original methodology developed by Hirano and
Imbens [34], to take into account the panel dimension of the dataset. Estimation is based
on the following sequential steps, applied to each payweek separately:
i. Both the growth rate of consumption, the treatment variable, and the covariates are
de-meaned at the household level;
ii. The conditional distribution of SCiwm given the covariates is estimated by maximum
likelihood, assuming a normal distribution for the error term;17
iii. The GPS, which is the conditional density of the treatment given the covariates, is
estimated;
iv. The balancing property is tested for all covariates;
v. The conditional expectation of the dependent variable is estimated parametrically with
a second-order polynomial function in both the treatment and the GPS, with standard
errors clustered at the household level;
vi. Finally, the dose-response function at a particular value of the treatment is estimated
by averaging the conditional expectation over the GPS at that value of the treatment.
17I followed Bia and Mattei [8] and used a Box-Cox transformation of SCiwm for which the null of normality
is rejected with p > 0.56 using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The variance-covariance matrix is allowed to be
clustered at the household level.
Figure 3.5 depicts the dose-response functions for payweeks 2, . . . , 5, along with bootstrapped
confidence intervals. Dose-response functions have been calculated for deciles 1-9 of the
treatment distribution, and linear interpolation is applied between them. Consistent with
the prior analysis, the effect of the drop on the growth rate of consumption has been labeled
γ on the vertical axis. This effect is never statistically different from zero for payweeks 2
and 3. For payweek 4, it is around -5% and is significant only for shocks larger than -50%.
Finally, in payweek 5, it is around -7.5% and statistically significant for any drop lower than
about -10%.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I developed a test for the joint identification of liquidity constraints and time
inconsistency in food consumption using real-life data on daily expenditures from a large
panel of Italian households.
Theory predicts that time-inconsistent, liquidity constrained households will not be able to
maintain a constant growth rate of consumption between paydays if they face a sudden neg-
ative shock to cash-on-hand. Assuming either time-consistency or perfect access to capital
markets, by contrast, theory predicts that households are always able to perfectly smooth
consumption within the paymonth. By implementing a triple differences estimate, I showed
that a large sample of Italian households facing a drop in total expenditures on grocery goods
between 2007 and 2009 experienced a significant intra-monthly decline in consumption of
fresh fruits and vegetables, particularly among younger and less educated households. This
decline seems not to be driven by intra-household strategic motives, strategic pricing, or
unexpected negative resources shocks at the end of the paymonth.
The empirical results, which are at odds with consumption models that assume time-
consistency, are robust to several confounding factors that may have biased previous results
toward the rejection of the standard RE-PIH model. They point to a new, high-frequency di-
mension of welfare analysis, in which cognitive abilities and psychological tracts may become
particularly important and standard assumptions of the RE-PIH model less salient.
3.8 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
All Sample With Fixed
Payday
Geog. Area
North-West 25.97 24.92
(0.17) (0.36)
North-East 21.12 27.26
(0.15) (0.36)
Centera 24.89 24.22
(0.17) (0.35)
South 28.02 23.60
(0.17) (0.36)
No. of Components
1 Comp. 24.58 30.53
(0.16) (0.36)
2 Comp. 30.11 25.52
(0.17) (0.36)
3 Comp. 21.14 22.33
(0.15) (0.35)
4 Comp. 17.81 17.95
(0.14) (0.30)
5 or more 6.35 3.67
(0.09) (0.37)
Age
Until 34 8.08 8.26
(0.15) (0.28)
35-44 18.11 19.21
(0.15) (0.31)
45-54 19.91 20.99
(0.16) (0.33)
55-64 19.04 20.65
(0.15) (0.32)
65 or more 34.60 30.89
(0.18) (0.32)
Education
Primary 29.98 27.97
(0.17) (0.36)
Lower Secondary 28.71 29.11
(0.72) (0.37)
Up. Sec. and Tertiary 41.31 42.92
(0.19) (0.30)
No. HH 6,655 1,832
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. All results use sample weights. a: includes Sardinia.
Table 3.2: Effect of a negative shock in total monthly expenditure on the growth rate of
consumption
PayWeek 1 PayWeek 2 PayWeek 3 PayWeek 4 PayWeek 5
Drop (γw) -0.046 0.004 0.012 -0.034 -0.043
(0.016)*** (0.016) (0.015) (0.17)** (0.016)**
Control (piw) 0.012 -0.010 -0.002 -0.010 -0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Notes: No. obs.: 14,572 observations. No. HH: 1,832. For each Payweek w, except for Payweek 1, the coefficients reported
are the sum of the baseline coefficient (either pi1 or γ1) and the corresponding coefficient (piw and γw, respectively). Controls
include day of the calendar week, day of the calendar month, holiday, pre-holiday, calendar month, and household fixed-effects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Table 3.3: Effect of a negative shock to total monthly expenditure - by age of the HH head
Payweek 1 PayWeek 2 PayWeek 3 PayWeek 4 PayWeek 5
Panel A: DDD estimate for household with head < 45
Drop (γw) -0.057 -0.002 0.010 -0.037 -0.067
(0.018)*** (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)** (0.015)***
Control (piw) 0.020 -0.020 0.016 -0.007 -0.028
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Panel B: DDD estimate for household with head ≥ 45
Drop (γw) -0.028 -0.004 0.011 -0.010 -0.039
(0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.15) (0.016)***
Control (piw) 0.009 0.012 0.0020 -0.017 -0.008
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Notes: No. obs.: 14,572 observations. No. HH: 1,832. For each Payweek w, except for Payweek 1, the coefficients reported
are the sum of the baseline coefficient (either pi1 or γ1) and the corresponding coefficient (piw and γw, respectively). Controls
include day of the calendar week, day of the calendar month, holiday, pre-holiday, calendar month, and household fixed-effects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Table 3.4: Effect of a negative shock to total monthly expenditure - by education group
PayWeek 1 PayWeek 2 PayWeek 3 PayWeek 4 PayWeek 5
Panel A: DDD estimate for low educated households
Drop (γw) -0.061 0.013 -0.032 -0.046 -0.089
(0.017)*** (0.018) (0.016)* (0.017)*** (0.018)***
Control (piw) 0.003 0.007 0.004 -0.015 -0.022
(0.015)* (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Panel B: DDD estimate for high educated households
Drop (γw) -0.016 -0.016 0.023 -0.026 -0.028
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.17) (0.018)
Control (piw) 0.027 -0.015 0.003 0.010 -0.025
(0.014)* (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
Notes: No. obs.: 14,572 observations. No. HH: 1,832. For each Payweek w, except for Payweek 1, the coefficients reported
are the sum of the baseline coefficient (either pi1 or γ1) and the corresponding coefficient (piw and γw, respectively). Controls
include day of the calendar week, day of the calendar month, holiday, pre-holiday, calendar month, and household fixed-effects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Table 3.5: Robustness checks
PayWeek 2 PayWeek 3 PayWeek 4 PayWeek 5
Panel A: market price differential as regressor
Drop -0.000 0.004 -0.030 -0.042
(γ1 + γw) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)**
Control -0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.009
(pi1 + piw) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Panel B: market price differential as instrument
Drop 0.014 0.010 -0.040 -0.044
(γ1 + γw) (0.021) (0.020) (0.22)* (0.021)**
Control -0.010 -0.002 -0.010 0.018
(pi1 + piw) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
Panel C: drop at the beginning of the month
Drop -0.004 -0.018 -0.030 -0.047
(γ1 + γw) (0.016) (0.015) (0.14)** (0.016)***
Control -0.013 -0.001 -0.008 0.003
(pi1 + piw) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Panel D: single households only
Drop -0.009 -0.032 -0.045 -0.061
(γ1 + γw) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024)* (0.026)**
Control -0.023 0.021 0.011 -0.004
(pi1 + piw) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
Panel E: dep.var. price in supermarkets/hyperstores
Drop 0.002 0.012 -0.005 -0.020
(γ1 + γw) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Control 0.004 0.000 0.019 -0.010
(pi1 + piw) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Panel F: dep.var. price in small groceries
Drop -0.013 0.008 -0.014 -0.007
(0.021) (0.020) (0.20) (0.020)
Control 0.003 -0.013 0.008 0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Notes: Controls include calendar effects and household fixed-effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at
the household level.
Table 3.6: Probability of being liquidity constrained: probit results and sample means.
Unconstrained HH Constrained HH
Variable Coefficient Variable Mean Variable Mean
Age -.011 57.9 49.9
(.003)***
Male -.099 63.1 59.1
(.083)
Primary Education .378 60.4 56.2
(.143)***
Secondary Education .307 30.6 37.7
(.144)**
Unemployed .209 2.7 5.2
(.229)
Pensioner -.103 36.7 22.1
(.126)
Household Size .073 2.5 2.8
(.034)**
Number of Earners -.048 1.7 1.7
(.058)
Constant -.688
(.248)***
Number of Obs. 7768 7460 308
F 7.954
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Omitted variables are: female headed household, tertiary education, being employed.
The probit specification includes a set of 18 regional dummies (Val d’Aosta is included in Piedmont, Molise is included in
Abruzzi) whose coefficient is not included here for the sake of brevity. All results used sampling weights provided by the Bank
of Italy.
Source: Author’s elaborations on 2006 SHIW.
Table 3.7: Effect of a negative shock to total monthly expenditure - by deciles of the liquidity
constraint dummy
PayWeek 2 PayWeek 3 PayWeek 4 PayWeek 5
Decile 1
Drop (γ1 + γw) 0.000 0.008 -0.002 0.017
( 0.017) ( 0.016) (0.18) (0.017)
Control -0.009 -0.002 -0.009 0.010
( 0.014) ( 0.014) ( 0.014) ( 0.015)
Decile 2
Drop (γ1 + γw) -0.016 0.022 -0.003 -0.015
( 0.014) ( 0.015) (0.13) (0.016)
Control -0.010 -0.002 -0.013 0.015
( 0.013) ( 0.014) ( 0.014) ( 0.014)
Decile 3
Drop (γ1 + γw) 0.007 -0.021 -0.018 -0.016
( 0.016) ( 0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
Control -0.012 -0.020 -0.006 -0.020
( 0.014) ( 0.013) ( 0.015) ( 0.014)
Decile 4
Drop (γ1 + γw) 0.011 0.008 -0.005 0.008
( 0.015) ( 0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Control 0.005 0.006 0.013 -0.017
( 0.011) ( 0.013) ( 0.011) ( 0.012)
Decile 5
Drop (γ1 + γw) 0.005 -0.017 0.006 -0.001
( 0.013) ( 0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Control 0.0009 0.006 0.013 -0.015
( 0.012) ( 0.011) ( 0.012) ( 0.011)
Decile 6
Drop (γ1 + γw) -0.012 0.019 -0.007 0.003
( 0.015) ( 0.017) (0.16) (0.018)
Control -0.013 -0.004 -0.012 0.006
( 0.016) ( 0.013) ( 0.014) ( 0.014)
Decile 7
Drop (γ1 + γw) 0.000 0.018 -0.004 0.009
( 0.017) ( 0.016) (0.18) (0.017)
Control -0.009 -0.002 -0.009 0.010
( 0.014) ( 0.014) ( 0.014) ( 0.015)
Decile 8
Drop (γ1 + γw) -0.006 0.011 -0.013 -0.017
( 0.014) ( 0.015) (0.13) (0.016)
Control -0.010 -0.002 -0.013 0.015
( 0.013) ( 0.014) ( 0.014) ( 0.014)
Decile 9
Drop (γ1 + γw) 0.006 0.013 -0.030 -0.045
( 0.016) ( 0.015) (0.017)* (0.016)**
Control -0.012 -0.020 -0.006 -0.020
( 0.014) ( 0.013) ( 0.015) ( 0.014)
Decile 10
Drop (γ1 + γw) -0.008 -0.012 -0.046 -0.081
( 0.012) ( 0.014) (0.013)*** (0.014)***
Control 0.005 0.006 0.013 -0.017
( 0.011) ( 0.013) ( 0.011) ( 0.012)
Notes: Controls include calendar effects, shopping behavior, and household fixed-effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are clustered at the household level.
Source: Author’s elaborations on ACNielsen Homescan.
Figure 3.1: Liquidity constraints, time inconsistency, and intra-monthly consumption patterns
Notes: the figure simulates intra-monthly consumption patterns in different settings. Parameter values commont to all specifications: δ = ρ = R = 1,
yt = N(1, 0.1) for t = 4k + 1. Time-inconsistency discount factor: β = 0.95. A negative shock is a drop in resources available at the beginning of the
month of two-times the standard deviations. The simulation code, prepared for Mathematica 5.0, is available upon request.
Figure 3.2: Consumption within the paymonth - predicted pattern
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of shocks in total monthly expenditure on grocery goods between
2007 and 2009.
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Notes: The graph plots the distribution of the rate of change in total monthly real expenditures for each
paymonth of each household between 2007 and 2009.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of the conditional probability of being liquidity constrained in the
Homescan dataset
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Figure 3.5: Dose-Response Functions
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3.9 Appendix: a general model of intertemporal con-
sumption with paydays
3.9.1 The Model
The consumer has to allocate resources in order to maximize her intertemporal utility func-
tion U(t) = u(ct) +
∑T−t
τ=1D(τ)u(ct+τ ), where u(ct) is a CRRA utility function, and D(t) is
a generic discount function. Each period t corresponds to one week, and income is received
every four periods. Without loss of generality, let us assume that income is received in
periods 4k + 1 for k ∈ Z. The end-of-time T is conveniently set sufficiently far away, by
assuming T →∞.
We assume that in the short-run, permanent income pt is constant, while multiplicative
transitory income shocks (vt) follow a stationary, mean one process.
The problem faced by the consumer is then:
max
ct∈C
U(t) (3.9)
s.th.
yt =


p · vt if t = 4k + 1 k ∈ Z
0 otherwise
At = R(At−1 − ct−1 + yt−1)
where C is a generic instantaneous budget constraint, R is the gross interest rate, assumed
to be constant over time, and At is a perfectly liquid asset.
Finally, let us define cash-on-hand asXt ≡ At+yt; lifetime wealth asWt ≡ Xt+
∑T−t
τ=1 R
−τEtyt+τ ,
and a transitory shock as St ≡ yt − E(yt).
We are interested in studying the intra-monthly growth rate of consumption under two
different assumptions on C and two assumptions on D(t). In particular:
• assumptions on the budget constraint: if C = [0,Wt] the consumer is liquidity uncon-
strained, if C = [0, Xt] she is liquidity constrained;
• assumptions on the discount function: if D(t) = δt the consumer is time-consistent, if
D(t) = 1 for t = 0, and D(t) = βδt for t > 0 she is time-inconsistent.
We distinguish between liquidity constrained and unconstrained consumers, first, and within
each case discuss the role of time-consistency and inconsistency.
3.9.2 Liquidity unconstrained consumers
As long as the end-of-time is sufficiently far away, and the consumer has perfect access to
capital market and no precautionary saving motives that prevents her to access it, both time-
consistency and time-inconsistency will yield a similar consumption pattern, with constant
growth rate of consumption between income receipts. To show this, consider the Euler
equation obtained assuming no liquidity constraints and time-inconsistency (Laibson [45]):
u′(ct) = REt
[
βδ
(
∂ct+1
∂Wt+1
)
+ δ
(
1−
∂ct+1
∂Wt+1
)]
u′(ct+1) (3.10)
The standard time-consistent case is obtained by assuming β = 1. The discount factor
between present and future marginal utility of consumption is a weighted average between
the short-term factor (βδ) and the long-term one (δ), with weights equal to the future
marginal propensity to consume and marginal propensity to save, respectively. The growth
rate is, thus, constant as long as the weights remain constant overtime. It is straightforward
to see that
∂ct
∂Wt
→
∂ct+1
∂Wt+1
as T − t→∞
Similarly, shocks to income at the beginning of the month do not have any effect on the
intra-monthly consumption pattern, since ∂Wt/∂St → 0 as T − t→∞.
3.9.3 Liquidity constraints
If consumers are prevented to borrow, due to explicit or implicit liquidity constraints, then
it can be shown (Harris and Laibson [32]) that consumption follows the Generalized Euler
relationship:
u′(ct) = REt
[
βδ
(
∂ct+1
∂Xt+1
)
+ δ
(
1−
∂ct+1
∂Xt+1
)]
u′(ct+1) (3.11)
which is very similar to the previous one, with the exception that the marginal propensity
to consume is now calculated out of future cash-on-hand, not wealth. To study the intra-
monthly consumption pattern in this case, we can follow Deaton [18] and Carroll [13], and
simulate the behavior of a liquidity constrained consumer and calculate the long-term con-
sumption functions for each period of the month. An additional assumption needed here is
that consumer must be ‘relatively impatience’, i.e. (Rβδ)
1
ρ/R ≤ 1.18
Simulation
To obtain the long-term consumption functions in this discrete-time intertemporal optimiza-
tion model with finite time, we must start from the end-of-the-time, when the optimal rule
is simply to consume all available resources: cT = xT , and then go backward using (3.11).
The consumption function is obtained by inverting the utility functions. For all t = 4k, the
optimal consumption function has to consider the future stochastic inflow of income, which
will increase future available resources.19
I perform a simple simulation exercise to compare the case in which β < 1 to the case in
which β = 1. I assume that the consumer faces a constant weekly interest factor R = 1.0011
(which, again, corresponds to an annual discount rate of slightly less than 5%), income is
a stationary, normally distributed process with µ = 100 and σ2 = 30, the coefficient of
relative risk aversion is ρ = 5, the long-term weekly discount factor is δ = 0.99 (slightly less
18This is what Carroll [14] calls the ‘return impatience condition’: the consumer must not be so patient
that an increase in available resources does not increase spending.
19Instead of numerically integrate all possible solutions to obtain the expected value, I follow Carroll [14]
and discretize the distribution of future income, obtaining a faster and accurate estimate of the optimal
consumption function.
than 0.99345, which corresponds to Deaton’s [18] yearly discount rate of 0.9090), and the
short-term discount factor is β = 0.9 for the quasi-hyperbolic case. I set T = 100, assume
that t = 1 is the first week of the first paymonth, and calculate the consumption function
for each t.
As it has been shown by Deaton [18], as long as the consumer is sufficiently impatient, the
finite-time consumption function should converge as we move backward from the end-of-time
to the beginning. However, in this case, there is a slight complication due to the fact that
income shocks arrive every four periods. Indeed, each of the four weeks within a paymonth
have a different distance with respect to the next income shock and this generates four dif-
ferent converged consumption functions: one for t = 4k + 1 (the week in which there is a
payday), one for t = 4k + 2 (the second week of the paymonth), one for t = 4k + 3 (the
third week), and one for t = 4k (the last week of the paymonth). Figure 3.6 shows the
convergence of each type of consumption function. Consider the top-left figure: it plots the
consumption functions of the first weeks of several paymonths. The straight line is, thus, the
first week of the last paymonth in life (the 25th in our case): at that time the rule is simply
to consume a fixed share of cash-on-hand, and leave the rest to the last three weeks. The
line below it corresponds to the first week of the 24th month: if resources are sufficiently
low with respect to their expected value, then the rule is again to consume that fixed share
and leave remaining resources for the next weeks of the paymonth. However, as resources
increase, a first discontinuity appears, and the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out
of cash-on-hand is reduced. The subsequent lines correspond to the first week of, from above
to below, the 22nd, the 20th, the 15th, and the 5th paymonth. The distance between them
rapidly shrinks: consumption functions converge.
A similar analysis can be done for the second week of the paymonth (top-right), the third
(bottom-left), and the fourth one (bottom-right). What must be noticed, however, is that
the slope of the straight line tends to increase as we move forward in the paymonth. Actu-
ally, in the fourth week, the slope of the line is 45 degrees, so that when liquidity constraints
bind, the consumer will simply set ct = xt.
For the simulation, I restrict my interest to the converged consumption functions, which
corresponds to the infinite-horizon case (Carroll [13]). Figure 3.7 compares the four con-
verged consumption functions in the quasi-hyperbolic case (left) to those in the exponential
case (right). As it can be seen, the two figures seem visually very similar, so that one could
conclude that there are no fundamental differences in consumption behavior between sophis-
ticated quasi-hyperbolic and exponential agents, apart from a relatively larger MPC (the
curves on the left figure are steeper than those on the right one). In fact, only pertains to
the values of Xt such that liquidity constraints are not binding.
Figure 3.8 shows the simulated income, saving and consumption patterns for 200 out of a
total of 400 simulated weeks. I use the converged consumption functions, so that the con-
sumer is not expected to die after the 400th week. In addition, I trim the first half of the
weeks, since in the simulation the consumer starts with no saving and I want her to build
up her long-term level of assets before analysing her behavior. The top panel shows the
income receipts (the dots) which are distributed around their average value (the solid line)
placed at 100. The middle and the bottom panel show, respectively, savings and consump-
tion for an exponential consumer (solid line) and a hyperbolic one (dashed line). Savings
spike at each payday, and decrease afterward. Those of the quasi-hyperbolic consumer are
everywhere weakly lower than those of the exponential consumer, since the former values
current consumption more than the latter. Consequently, consumption of the hyperbolic
consumer has a larger variance and reacts more to positive and negative temporary shocks
in income. The overall path of consumption does not seem to be significantly different, how-
ever. The most important differences come out right after t = 300, when consumers face a
series of low income shocks that decrease their cash-on-hands. I focus on consumption pat-
terns around that period in Figure 3.9 and look at the intra-monthly consumption behavior
of both types of consumer. Before the negative shocks, when liquidity constraints do not
bind, the within-month rate of reduction in consumption is constant both for exponential
and quasi-hyperbolic consumers, albeit for the latter it is higher. However, after t = 300,
income shocks are such that liquidity constraints start binding and the behavior of the two
consumers differ. Indeed, the rate of decline for the quasi-hyperbolic consumer becomes
increasing within the month (as it can be seen by the concave declining pattern lasting four
weeks, followed by a peak at the subsequent payday), while for the exponential agent it
is still constant. In short, when liquidity constraint binds time-inconsistent agents are no
longer able to maintain a smooth consumption pattern within the paymonth, since the cost
of self-control becomes unsustainable as the marginal gain from consuming today increases.
To have a clearer picture of what is happening we can return to the consumption functions
analysis. Let’s consider the growth rate of consumption from week t−1 to t: ct−ct−1
ct
. Another
way of interpreting the previous finding is that this rate is a function of available resources,
and decreases markedly when liquidity constraint binds. Define X1 as the resources available
in the first week of the paymonth, i.e. saving from previous month plus the new income in-
flow. We are interested in how the weekly growth rate of consumption changes as a function
of X1. That is, we are interested in studying the functions
χ(X1) =
cτ (X1)− cτ−1(X1)
cτ−1(X1)
for τ ∈ {2, 3, 4} (3.12)
Figure 3.10 plots these functions for the exponential and the quasi-hyperbolic cases. The
exponential consumer has the same discount rate for all weeks of the paymonth and for all
possible levels of cash-on-hands at payday, and it is (in this simulation) at around −0.035.
The quasi-hyperbolic consumer, instead, presents sharp differences. When liquidity con-
straint binds, i.e. when cash-on-hands at payday is sufficiently below its expected value, the
rate of decline between weeks is higher at the end of the month with respect to the beginning
of the month. As cash-on-hands increases the different decline rates tend to converge at the
same level, which is nonetheless lower than the exponential one.
Why does the intra-monthly growth rate differs so sharply depending on the level of cash-on-
hand? When liquidity contraints bind, it is easy to show that the pattern is concave declining
over the month (see the paper). When, instead, liquidity constraints are present but not
binding, time-inconsistent agents at the beginning of the month must trade-off the utility of
anticipating consumption today over the disutility of a discontinuity in consumption between
the end of the month and the beginning of the next one. Such a disutility reduces present
consumption vis-a`-vis future consumption and effectively constraints short-term impatience.
Thus, the consumer will try to maintain a constant consumption pattern over the month,
whenever he is able to (i.e. if liquidity constraints are not binding).
3.9.4 Conclusions
This short appendix analyses the intra-monthly growth rate of consumption for an agent
that receives income once per month. It is shown that neither liquidity constraints nor time-
inconsistency per se result in a change in the growth rate of consumption over the month.
Indeed, only the joint presence of both yields a declining growth rate as we move from one
income receipt to the other.
3.10 Figures
Figure 3.6: Convergence of consumption functions
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Notes: Convergence of consumption functions for each week of the paymonth. In each figure lines correspond, from the upper to the lower, to the last
paymonth, to the first-to-last, to the third-to-last, to the fifth-to-last, to tenth-to-last, and to the first paymonth. T=100, R = 1.0011, Yt = 1, ρ = 5,
δ = 0.99, β = 0.94
Figure 3.7: Converged consumption functions for quasi-hyperbolic and exponential consumers
Notes: The figure plots infinite-horizon consumption functions for (respectively, from bottom to top) the first, second, third, and fourth week since
payday, for quasi-hyperbolic (left) and exponential (right) consumers. T=400, R = 1.0011, Yt = 1, ρ = 5, δ = 0.99, β = 0.94
Figure 3.8: Simulation of income, saving, and consumption for exponential (solid line) and
quasi-hyperbolic (dashed) consumers
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
inc
om
e
200 250 300 350 400
0
10
0
20
0
sa
vin
g
200 250 300 350 400
20
25
30
co
ns
um
pti
on
200 250 300 350 400
time
Notes: The converged (infinite-horizon) consumption functions are used. The first 200 weeks are trimmed.
Parameters used: r = 0.0011, Y ∼ N(100, 30), ρ = 5, δ = 0.99, β = 0.9
Figure 3.9: Simulation of income, saving, and consumption: focus on consumption around
a series of low-income shocks
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Figure 3.10: Rate of decline of consumption between weeks, as a function of cash-on-hand
at the beginning of the month: exp. and q-h sophisticated
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Abstract
We study both theoretically and empirically what happens when waves of less informed
consumers enter a retail market. The theoretical model shows that firms may react by in-
creasing price in order to extract surplus from less informed consumers. This effect, however,
should decline as the degree of competition in the market increases. We gather data from a
large sample of Italian pharmacies and identify the effect of an increase in newborns on the
average price charged for a basket of child hygiene products at the municipal level, under
the assumption that parents of newborns that just entered the market are less informed
consumers. Consistently with the model, we find a positive effect of newborns on average
price. We study the effect of competition on the elasticity of price to newborns by exploiting
the Italian legislative framework, which defines a threshold based on resident population to
define the number of pharmacies allowed to enter the market. Identification uses the fuzzy
RD design set by the law. We find that an increase in competition has a significant and
negative effect on the elasticity of price to changes in less informed consumers.
4.1 Introduction
Starting from the seminal work of Hal Varian [68], the role of consumers’ information on
market prices has been the object of a vast theoretical literature in industrial organization.
On the empirical side, however, economists have only recently started to identify the effects
of search costs and incomplete information in markets. The existing literature has focused
on identifying evidence of mixed strategy in firm’s pricing,2 and on estimating the effect of
competition on price dispersion.3 Both results have been considered evidence of imperfect
information among consumers.
In this paper, we provide a novel identification strategy, testing a new set of theoretical im-
plications of models with imperfect consumers’ information. We study what happens to the
expected price and quantity when waves of uninformed buyers enter a market. In addition,
we estimate how the effect of an increase in the share of uninformed buyers is affected by an
exogenous increase in the degree of competition.
Our analysis rests on the assumption that immediately after child birth, parents suddenly
enter as buyers in the market of the goods that are necessary to raise their baby, but are
relatively less informed than other consumers of those products. They are also more likely
to be under pressure (... when the kid cries!), since they are less able to evaluate the urgency
of children’s needs and claims.
We show theoretically that an increase in the number of less informed consumers should
raise the average price in the market, and that this effect should be declining in the number
of competitors. Both results can be obtained assuming either perfectly or imperfectly sub-
stitutability of the products of different shops in the market.
For each of the 8,092 Italian municipalities (henceforth, Cities), we have data on the number
of newborn babies at the monthly frequency between 2006 and June 2010. We have also
identified a set of hygiene products specifically designed for small babies and we are able to
2Lach [43], DeCicca et al. [20], Martin-Oliver et al. [50].
3Gerardi and Shapiro [27], Lewis [47], and Lach and Moraga-Gonzalez [44].
access monthly data on the quantities of these goods sold by a large number of pharmacies
in these Cities, together with charged prices. Thanks to these unique sets of data, under
relatively mild assumptions4 we are able to estimate the elasticity of the equilibrium price
and of the equilibrium quantity with respect to a shock in the monthly number of newborns.
Consistently with the theoretical predictions, we find that a percentage increase in the num-
ber of newborns significantly raises the average price at the City level. There are other
possible interpretations for this result (most notably increasing marginal costs) but none
of these alternative interpretations is consistent with the other available pieces of evidence.
We even find that sold quantities increase, which is the straightforward result of a demand
shock.
The insights of the theoretical model invites us to search for exogenous sources of variation
in the number of sellers. We find these sources by concentrating the analysis on cities whose
maximum population during the last 45 years is in a neighborhood of the 7500 units thresh-
old. Indeed, the Italian law prescribes that cities with a population lower than this threshold
should have only one pharmacy, while an additional pharmacy should be opened in Cities
above the threshold. With respect to current population, there is substantial non-compliance
with this rule, partly because of geographic reasons5, but more importantly because during
the post-war period, when population grew above the threshold, pharmacies were opened
but later they were not closed if population declined under the threshold. However, precisely
for this reason, the maximum population size reached historically by cities generates a par-
tially fuzzy assignment mechanism for the current number of pharmacies. We exploit this
assignment mechanism within a Regression Discontinuity Design to study how the number
of sellers influences the effect of an increase in the share of less informed consumers.
Using this identification strategy we show that Cities immediately above the thresholds (in
terms of maximum historical population) have, on average, a larger number of pharmacies
4Controlling for City and time fixed effects, the variation in newborns at the monthly frequency is arguably
random.
5The presence of remote areas or valleys within the City boundaries is the most commong motivation for
being allowed to have more pharmacies than what the Law would prescribe.
than cities immediately below. As a consequence, where the number of competing pharma-
cies is larger for this exogenous reason, the elasticity of equilibrium prices to newborns is
close to zero, while it is instead positive and significant when the number of pharmacies is
lower. We interpret this finding as evidence that in less competitive environments sellers can
exploit to their advantage increases of demand originating from less informed consumers, as
the model predicts. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the
theoretical background that drives our empirical exercise. Section 4.3 present the empirical
strategy while section 4.4 introduces the data and provides descriptive statistics. The effect
of newborns on equilibrium price and quantity is estimated in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6
we present the RD design, that we use in Section 4.7 to study the effect of increasing the
number of competitors on the average price and quantity, and in Section 4.8 to estimate
the effect of the number of competitors on the elasticity of price and quantity to a shock
in newborns. Section 4.9 discusses alternative explanations and performs robustness checks.
Section 4.10 concludes.
4.2 Less informed buyers and the number of sellers:
the theoretical insight
In a market for a good there are S shops and two groups of consumers. A first group is
composed of N It ”regular” consumers who are fully informed about prices available in period
t. The individual demand of each one of these consumers for the good purchased at shop i
is qIi (p, S) where p = (pi, p−i), pi is the prices of shop i and p−i the vector of prices of all
other shops.
There are also NUt consumers who just entered the market and may be also in
a hurry when they decide to buy, so that they express a possibly different demand qUi (p˜, S˜)
for the good at shop i, where p˜ and S˜ respectively indicate with compact notation the
information consumers have about prices and shops. There are many explanations for why
qUi may differ from q
I
i . In our case, for instance, we consider child hygiene products. These
type of goods are consumed both by newborns and by other non-child consumers6. While
the latter use them continuously over time and thus have the opportunity to substantial
learning, parents of newborns are normally very pressed and may be completely new to the
market of childcare products (especially when they are having their first child). In this case
we may expect that they are much less attentive and informed about prices in the market,
which implies that the demand of uninformed and hurried parents of newborns qUi is less
elastic with respect to price pi than the demand q
I
i of the other informed consumers.
For brevity we will indicate the NUt consumers as the uninformed, although
they may be simply less informed than the informed consumers.
At any period t, we assume that there is an inflow of uninformed which is IID
over time and, for simplicity, we assume that they remain in the market only for 1 period.
In general, although we do not explicitly model this possibility, N It may also depend on
uninformed inflows of periods preceding date t.After some periods of purchase some unin-
formed consumers may learn enough information and thus enter the group of N It informed
consumers. Although we do not allow for this possibility, we will test it with our empirical
analysis. See below for a discussion.
We also assume that shops cannot discriminate the two groups of consumers
and thus set a single price.
The profit of shop i can be written as
pii = (pi − ci)
[
qIi (p, S)N
I
t + q
U
i (p˜, S˜)N
U
t
]
, (4.1)
where ci is the constant marginal cost (see later for a discussion of non-constant marginal
6Ointments for child skin protection are largely used by sportsmen; shampoos, bath foams, and barrier
creams for children are extensively used by adults aswell.
costs). For given price of competitors, the first order condition for own price is thus simply
[
qIi + (pi − ci)
∂qIi
∂pi
]
N It +
[
qUi + (pi − ci)
∂qUi
∂pi
]
NUt = 0 (4.2)
We can then derive the following simple observation.
Remark 1. If the individual demand of all types of consumers is the same, then for given
number of shops, the equilibrium price of any shop is independent of the number of consumers.
This is a simple consequence of the fact that when the demand of both types
of consumers is the same qi(p, S), then the previous optimality condition becomes
[
qi + (pi − ci)
∂qi
∂pi
]
(N It +N
U
t ) = 0 (4.3)
and the total number of consumers N It +N
U
t cancels out.
This is not the case, instead, when demands are different. In particular, and
as argued above, we may well expect that for given prices, uninformed consumers are less
responsive to price changes than informed ones. To investigate this possibility we develop
two approaches as for the degree of substitutability of the goods of the different shops for
the informed consumers. These models lead to different conclusions in terms of pure and
mixed strategies for equilibrium pricing and for some comparative statics which we will then
investigate with our empirical analysis.
4.2.1 Perfect substitutable products.
Since Varian [68], it is well known that when uninformed consumers do not react to price
changes and goods are perfect substitutes for the informed ones, then there are no equilibria
in pure strategies. The reason is that shops face the trade-off to extract the maximal rent
from uninformed consumers, thus increasing price (the rent extraction effect), but at the
same time they would like to reduce their price in order to sell to all informed consumers
(the business stealing effect).
Let uninformed consumers be price-insensitive, i.e. ∂qUi \∂pi = 0, and each of
them buys randomizing among the S shops. Furthermore, with perfect substitutability, we
have that qIi (p) is nil whenever pi > p−i. To simplify exposition we assume unitary demand
for any type of consumer, with a value v for the good and common marginal cost c.
We can then consider symmetric equilibria in which the probability that each
shop j sets a price lower than p is G(p). The profit of shop i is then
pii = (pi − c)
[
(1−G(pi))
S−1N It +
NUt
S
]
. (4.4)
The first term in the squared parenthesis is the demand of informed consumers and (1 −
G(pi))
S−1 is the probability that price pi is actually the lowest price among all firms. The
second term refers to the fraction of uninformed consumers who randomly enter shop i.
The symmetric equilibrium is (for details see Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez [39],
among others)
G(p) = 1−
[
v − p
S(p− c)
NUt
N It
] 1
S−1
on [p0, v] (4.5)
where
p0 = c+ (v − c)
NUt
NUt + SN
I
t
(4.6)
is the lowest price in the support of the mix strategy G.
The comparative statics of G with respect to S is ambiguous. In fact, a larger
number of competitors does not induce a first order stochastic dominance change in G: a
higher S strengthens the business stealing effect thus inducing a lower p0, but at the same
time it increases the rent extraction effect (shops respond with a higher price to a lower
fraction of uniformed due to more shops sharing these consumers).
However, one can derive the following result.
Remark 2 (Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez [39], Proposition 1). The expected price
E[p] =
∫ v
p0
v
S(S − 1)(p− c)
NUt
N It
[
v − p
S(p− c)
NUt
N It
] 2−S
S−1
dp (4.7)
(
NUt
N It
) 1
S−1
∫ v
p0
v
S(S − 1)(p− c)
[
v − p
S(p− c)
] 2−S
S−1
dp (4.8)
is increasing in S and in NUt (and decreasing in N
I
t ).
The quoted paper also shows that when also uninformed consumers optimally
randomize between buying or not buying (which requires that the number of shops is suffi-
ciently large), then taking this effect into account E[p] does not vary with S.
4.2.2 Imperfect substitutes
Here we model imperfect substitute goods for informed consumers with a simple analysis
based on a Salop model. The S shops are evenly distributed on a unitary circle so as
consumers of both types. Thus, each consumer can be defined by her position xi ∈ [0, 1] in
the circle. Let τ be the consumer’s transport cost.
Decision of informed is as follows. The consumer indifferent between shops i
and i+ 1 is at
pi + τ(x
I
i,i+1 −
i
S
) = pi+1 + τ(
i+ 1
S
− xIi,i+1) (4.9)
from which
xIi,i+1 =
pi+1 − pi
2τ
+
1 + 2i
2S
(4.10)
By analogy we can identify the consumer indifferent between shop i and shop i− 1 at
xIi,i−1 =
pi − pi−1
2τ
+
2i− 1
2S
(4.11)
Setting pi−1 = pi+1 = p as in a symmetric equilibrium, the demand of informed consumers
is
N It (x
I
i,i+1 − x
I
i,i−1) = N
I
t (
1
S
+
p− pi
τ
) (4.12)
Consider now uninformed. The consumer indifferent between shop i and i+1
is at
xUi,i+1 =
pei+1 − p
e
i
2τ
+
1 + 2i
2S
(4.13)
where pek is expectation of price k for uninformed consumers. The one indifferent between
shop i and i− 1 is at
xUi,i−1 =
pei − p
e
i−1
2τ
+
2i− 1
2S
(4.14)
Hence the total demand for uninformed for shop i is
NUt (x
U
i,i+1 − x
U
i,i−1) = N
U
t (
1
S
+
pe − pei
τ
) (4.15)
Notice that the demand of uninformed is based on their expectation on prices and is thus
not responsive on actual price, although we will impose rational expectations so that in
equilibrium pe is equal to the (symmetric) equilibrium price.
The profit of firm i is then
pii = (pi − ci)[N
I
t (
1
S
+
p− pi
τ
) +NUt (
1
S
+
pe − pei
τ
)]. (4.16)
Solving for the optimal price and imposing symmetry
p∗ = c+
τ
S
N It +N
U
t
N It
(4.17)
which is decreasing in N It and increasing in N
U
t . It is also decreasing in S.
Remark 3. The equilibrium price with differentiated good is increasing in NUt and decreasing
in S (and in N It ). The cross effect of S and N
U
t is negative: ∂
2p∗/∂NUt ∂S < 0
4.3 Empirical strategy
To test the predictions of the theoretical model, we study how the equilibrium price and
quantity are affected by a demand shock deriving from a change in the number of less
informed consumers in the market. We argue that a measure of this kind of shock is repre-
sented by changes at the monthly frequency in the number of newborns in the City where
the pharmacy is located. The choice of this measure needs to be justified on two grounds.
First, it must be true that the parents of newborns are less informed. As it will be apparent
in the next section, we are going to focus on a subgroup of products that must be bought after
birth and that are used extensively during the first years of life of the child. Thus, the need
for this products emerge only after the birth of the baby. In addition, gathering information
on prices of these products is likely to be costly, because it is mostly obtained by performing
trips to pharmacies.7 All in all, it is plausible to assume that parents of newborns do not
have perfect information on the distribution of prices among pharmacies. Noteworthy, some
child hygiene products, like after diaper change ointments, are largely consumed by runners
and bikers to prevent skin rash. This suggests that in this market there is also a stock of
other consumers that are, to the contrary of newborns’ parents, informed. The stock of
informed buyers is a specific characteristic of each municipality. Our identification strategy
relies on the fact that there is not a substantial correlation between changes in uninformed
consumers and changes in informed ones (conditioning on a set of municipality and time
fixed effects). In Section 4.9 we present substantial evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
Second, a change in the number of newborns should be a random event, i.e. it should not be
correlated with any non-ignorable characteristic. Since in our analysis we will always control
for city and time fixed effects, we will be using as a shock the time variation in the number
of newborns from month to month, net of any possible seasonality or aggregate-trend effects.
Given the randomness in the actual dates of delivery of newborns, we feel confident that this
7In principle, consumers may even use the internet to learn the expected price. However, even the
acquisition of information from the internet is far from being costless.
identifying assumption is satisfied.
In order to estimate the effect of an increase in the number of competitors S, we need to
identify an exogenous source of variation in the number of pharmacies in the market. Here,
the legislative features of the Italian pharmacy market come at hand. In Italy, entry and
exit in the pharmacy market are regulated by the Law 475/1968. The Law establishes the
so-called ‘demographic criterion’ for defining the number of pharmacies in each City: for
Cities under 12,500 inhabitants, there must be one pharmacy every 5,000 inhabitants; for
Cities above 12,500 inhabitants, there must be one pharmacy every 4,000 inhabitants. The
thresholds for allowing an additional pharmacy to enter are placed in the middle of any mul-
tiple of 4,000 or 5,000 inhabitants. Thus, Cities right below 7,500 inhabitants should have
one pharmacy, while those right above it should have two. Further discussions on the fuzzy
regression discontinuity design provided by this legislative framework are left to Section 4.6.
Given these identification strategies, the following empirical model can be considered.
For each City c ∈ {1, . . . , C} at month t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, we observe the average
quantity sold qct and price charged pct by the Sc pharmacies present. In addition, in each
month we observe newborns at the city level Nct. Given the previous theoretical analysis,
we consider the following linear model for each of the dependent variables Yct = {qct, pct}:
Yct = α + βSc + δNct + λSc ×Nct + φc + µt + εct (4.18)
where φc and µt are, respectively, City and time fixed-effects, and εct is an error term, which
we allow to display both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the City level. We are
going to exploit this framework with three empirical exercises.
Model A
We exploit within City variation in newborns in a standard fixed-effect model, and estimate
the following:
Yct = a+ dNct + hc + gt + uct (4.19)
the resulting coefficient d is the effect of Nct averaged over different levels of competition Sc.
That is, d = δ+λE(Sc). Note that Nct is uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error term uct.
If parents of newborns are indeed less informed consumers, we shall expect a positive d for
price. If instead, they are as informed as other consumers, the effect on price should be
weakly negative.8 In both cases, the increase in demand should raise sold quantities.
Model B
Each variable Xct in model (4.18) is integrated over time, to obtain X¯c = E(Xct|c). Thus,
from the original model, we obtain the following:
Y¯c = a+ bS¯c + lS¯c × N¯c + ec (4.20)
Notice that S¯c = Sc, since the number of pharmacies in a municipality remain constant over
time.9
OLS estimates of b and l are likely to be biased due to several possible unobserved factors
that affect the number of competitors, the average number of newborns, and the expected
value of the outcome variables.10
In order to overcome this problem, we exploit the afore-mentioned 7,500 threshold to study
the effect of moving from one to two pharmacies in the City. Let Popc denote the reference
population in City c, and κ be the threshold value.11
8This holds if we assume constant or declining marginal costs for the pharmacy, as in the model. Given
the features of the pharmacy market, we are quite confident in ruling out that pharmacists face increasing
marginal costs for the products used in this study. Further discussion on this point is left to Section 4.9.
9In our sample, this holds for more than 90% of municipalities.
10For instance, Cities where there is a larger willingness-to-pay are likely to display higher number of
competitors, higher quantities, and higher prices. If willingness-to-pay is correlated with wealth, age, or
other socioeconomic variables, then endogeneity of newborns is plausible aswell.
11In general, the assignment variable Popc should be measured before the treatment period (i.e. 2007-
2010). Discussion on the choice of Popc is left to Section 4.6.
The RD design has two important implications. First, it is necessary to include a polynomial
in the assignment variable (i.e., resident population) stratified according to the side of the
threshold (Imbens and Lemieux [37]). Second, in this model is no longer possible to estimate
the effect of S¯c×N¯c. This is because the RD design is such that the assignment to treatment
S¯c should be unconfounded with respect to newborns around the threshold, and thus the
interaction term should be perfectly collinear with the treatment variable.12
The RD regression function is then:
Yc = a+ bSc + f(|Popc − κ|) + ec (4.21)
Where f(·) is a polynomial function. Given unconfoundedness around the threshold, we
have b = β.
In general, we may expect average sold quantity to decline as the number of competitors
increase. For what regards the price, however, the model does not yield a clear prediction
on the sign of b: with perfectly substitutable goods, it should be positive. If, instead, the
goods are not perfect substitutes, it should be negative.
Model C
In our final and more ambitious exercise, we estimate the interaction effect of competition
and inflows of less informed consumers, exploiting both the City level variability in Nct and
the RD design for instrumenting Sc.
For this, we use an algorithm made of three steps:
i. we regress prices, quantities, and newborns on City and time fixed effects to obtain
the demeaned values, i.e. we consider the following model for dependent variables
Hct = {Nct, qct, pct}:
Hct = φc + µt + ηct (4.22)
12Formally, limPop→κ− E(N¯c) = limPop→κ+ E(N¯c). This hypothesis is statistically tested and confirmed
in Section 4.6.
demeaned values of each variables are simply the error term: H˜ct = η
H
ct .
ii. for each City separately, we regress demeaned prices and quantities on demeaned new-
borns. That is, we run a total of C regressions:
Y˜ct = ac + dcN˜ct + uct (4.23)
each regression yields dc = δ+λcS+γQc, where Qc is some unobserved city character-
istic affecting the elasticity of outcome variables to newborns. This missing variable
prevents us from naively comparing Cities with different number of pharmacies.
iii. we can overcome the problem posed by Qc by exploiting the RD design. Indeed, given
the unconfoundnedness assumption, around the threshold κ we have limPop→κ− E(Q¯c) =
limPop→κ+ E(Q¯c).
We then estimate the final model:
dˆYc = a+ lSc + f(|Popc − κ|) + vc (4.24)
where dˆYc is the estimated value of d obtained from regressing price and quantity as in
model (4.23).
The coefficient l in model (4.24) is a consistent estimate of λ.
According to the theoretical model, we may expect a negative value for this interaction
term with respect to the average price: an increase in the number of competitors
should reduce the ability of pharmacies to extract surplus from lack of information by
consumers.
In the next Section, we discuss the data we use to perform these three exercises and provide
some descriptive statistics of them.
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics
To test the predictions of the previous models, we use information from a large sample of
Italian pharmacies, collected by the consulting firm Newline. Newline is an IT company
that in the period considered (from January 2007 to July 2010: 2007-2010, henceforth) has
produced software for pharmacies. With the consent of its clients we were given access
to the details of every item sold by each pharmacy in the Newline data base. During
the period of interest, Newline collected data from 3,331 Italian pharmacies (i.e., around
18.6% of the reference universe). For 60% of them, we have complete information for all
years; for 28.7% of the sample we have information starting from January 2009; and for the
remaining 11.26% of the sample data is available only for the period January 2007-December
2008. Sampled pharmacies belong to almost all the Italian regions (with the exception of
Basilicata). However, they are typically concentrated in the North, since the company is
located near Milan.13
Among the products sold by pharmacies, we selected a category that is potentially of specific
interest for parents of newborn babies: child hygiene products.14 The category includes the
following types of products: bath foams and shampoos for babies; cleansers for babies; cold
and barrier creams and oils for babies; baby wipes; talcum and other after-bath products for
babies. Table 4.11 describes a sample of items in this basket: the upper panel shows the five
products sold in largest quantity during the period 2007-2010, while the lower panel shows
products which reported the highest unit price over the same period.
For each item, we obtained from Newline the quantity sold by each pharmacy in each month
and the price charged.15
13There are 19% of the Newline pharmacies in the norht east of Italy, 45% in the north west, 9% in the
center, 16% in the south and 11% in the islands.
14We considered even other categories: notably, powder milk and diapers. Powder milk does not have
enough variability in prices. For diapers, results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with hygiene
products.
15For items which have not been sold for an entire month, the price imputed is simply the price announced
by the pharmacy. For items which have a positive sold quantity, the monthly price imputed by Newline is
the weighted average between the (possibly) different prices charged over the month, with weights equal to
the number of items sold at each price level.
To create an aggregated product, we construct Laspeyres indexes for the price and the
quantity of the basket of hygiene goods (hereafter, the price and the quantity). Let h ∈
1, . . . , H indicate each product of the basket, then price and quantity indexes for pharmacy
i in month t are defined by:
pit =
∑
h pihtq¯h∑
h p¯hq¯h
(4.25)
qit =
∑
h p¯hqiht∑
h p¯hq¯h
(4.26)
where q¯h and p¯h are, respectively, the average monthly sold quantity and the average price
charged for product h in all months by all pharmacies.
Trends of these two indexes are plotted in the left panels of Figure 4.1. As it can be seen, sold
quantities are characterized by seasonality (with the most relevant peaks during summer) and
a somehow downward trend. Conversely, prices are characterized by a more robust upward
trend, topping 1.02 in February 2010. In our empirical strategy, we are going to exploit
within pharmacy variance in both variables. The right panels shows that both quantity and
price change subtantially at the intra-pharmacy level. The two figures plot the residuals of
a regression of (log) quantity and (log) price on pharmacy and time fixed effects. Although
the variance of quantities is bigger, there is substantial variability even in prices.
Data on monthly newborns are obtained at the City level from the National Statistical
Office. They are plotted in the left panel of Figure 4.2. As it can be seen there is a significant
seasonality in newborns: the most important peaks are during summer, while lowest levels are
reached during spring. Finally, the residuals of a regression of (log) newborns on pharmacy
and time fixed effects are plotted in the right panel of the figure: the presence of within-
pharmacy/within-month variance in newborns can be appreciated.
Ideally we would like to measure monthly newborns in some neighborhood of the pharmacy,
but we can only measure it at the level of a city. Therefore in the empirical analysis we
aggregate the Newline pharmacies in each City and consider as a unit of observation the
average price index and the average quantity index of all the newline pharmacies in each
City. Descriptive statistics for these and the other variables used in the econometric analyses
are described in Table 4.2.
Obviously, we do not observe the quantity and the price of the non-sampled pharmacies
within each city and in nearby cities. These are potential confounding factor and we will
discuss the extent to which they may affect our results in the robustness section of the paper.
We will also produce results restricted to the cities in which we observe all the pharmacies,
to show that our conclusions hold also in that case.
4.5 Model A: the effect of newborns on equilibrium
quantities and prices
We start by estimating model A using the fixed-effects within-estimator. Table 4.4 shows
the results using different temporal aggregates for the (log) newborns. In Panel A we regress
quantity and price measured at time t on newborns measured at time t. We find a positive
and highly significant effect on both dependent variables. In particular, a 10% increase
in the number of newborns causes a 0.2% increase in the quantity index and a 0.005%
increase in the price charged. Alternatively, simple calculation shows that an increase of 1
standard deviation in log-newborns increases log-price by 0.2 standard deviations. Measuring
newborns within a larger window marginally reinforces our findings: in Panel B we consider
births at time t and t− 1, in Panel C we consider newborns in the last quarter.
The positive effect on sold quantities can be considered the simple effect of an increase in
the number of consumers. The positive effect on price, however, contradicts the result that
could be obtained with a standard model that assumes perfect information from consumers.
Instead, it is consistent with our proposed model in which an increase in the number of
uninformed consumers increase the ‘rent extraction effect’ and thus generates a raise in the
equilibrium price.
The theoretical model suggests, in addition, that the number of competitors may affect the
strength of the ‘rent extraction effect’. As a first assessment, we stratify model A by number
of pharmacies in the City. Notably, we distinguish Cities where there is a single pharmacy
with Cities where there are more than one pharmacy. Results, summarized in Table 4.5,
show that the positive effect is solely reported among municipalities where there is a single
pharmacy.
This stratification, however, cannot be used to infer any causal relationship between the
number of competitors and the elasticity of price to newborns. Indeed, the number of
pharmacies in a City is clearly endogenous, being likely to be correlated with several relevant
confounding factors. It is, thus, necessary to identify a source of exogenous variation in this
variable.
4.6 The Regression Discontinuity design
As previously discussed, entry and exit in the pharmacy market is regulated by a law
(L.475/1968) enforced in 1968. The ‘demographic criterion’ in it establishes a set of thresh-
olds for each City according to the number of residents. An additional pharmacy should
be opened at 7,500, 12,500, 14,000, and from there on every 4,000 additional inhabitants.
Unfortunately, our sample size allows us to focus solely on the first threshold (i.e., from one
to two pharmacies). Thus, we focus on Cities in a neighborhood of 7,500 inhabitants and
study whether there is a significant change in the number of pharmacies at the threshold.
The left panel of Figure 4.3 shows the local polynomial smoothing estimates of the number
of pharmacies, together with the 95% confidence intervals. As it can be seen, we fail to
identify a significant difference at the threshold. Our conjecture is that this may be due
to the fact that the Law does not specifiy the criterion for choosing the pharmacies that
should be closed if the population declines below 7,500. This, coupled with the likely re-
sistance by incumbents to be forced to exit from the market, would imply that there is a
substantial downward rigidity in compliance to the law. If, however, compliance is larger
upwardly than downwardly, we are likely to have a stronger result by using the maximum
population reached in the last decades to predict the actual number of pharmacies. The
result of this exercise, plotted in the right panel of Figure 4.3, shows that the number of
pharmacies display a positive and significant change at the threshold. Still, there is a signif-
icant non-compliance with respect to the ‘demographic criterion’, as the average number of
pharmacies right before the threshold is significantly higher than 1.
Table 4.3 confronts the expected values of several possible confounding factors right before
and after the threshold, and tests the null of equality between the means. There is no evi-
dence of significant differences at the threshold for any of the control variables.16 Nonetheless,
in some empirical specifications we include these regressors to control for any possible effect
driven by marginal differences in covariates.
4.7 Model B: estimating the effect of competition on
the average price and quantity sold
We start exploiting the RD design integrating observations over time and obtaining City-
level averages in variables, to study the effect of competition on the average price and quan-
tity. Figure 4.4 plots the local polynomial estimates of log(quantity) against the population
(measured at its maximum in the period 1961-2006). The polynomial has been estimated
separately below and above the 7,500 inhabitants threshold. There are strong evidence that
sold quantity is continuous at the threshold. A similar finding is obtained by looking at
the average (log) price (Figure 4.5: the confidence intervals plotted show that there is no
signficant jump in the variable around the threshold.)
We turn to regression analysis, and here we focus on the intention-to-treat effect.17 Table
4.6 reports results using different windows around the threshold and different polynomial
functions in the population. The first Panel shows results using a local linear regression in
16We even test for continuity of the density of control variables at the threshold with a local linear
regression, as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux [37]: we fail to reject the null of continuity for all covariates.
Results are available upon request.
17Results of the IV estimate are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
a narrow window of ± 1,500 inhabitants around the 7,500 threshold. Subsequent panels use
higher-order polynomials with larger windows. As previously noticed, the threshold has a
positive effect on the number of pharmacies in the City, which raises significantly by around
0.5. The effect on the average price and quantity is, however, never statistically different
from zero. This zero effect is robust to the inclusion of the afore-mentioned set of covariates.
4.8 Model C: can competition between sellers offset
the effect of less informed buyers?
In our last empirical exercise, we study how the elasticity of price and quantity to an increase
in newborns changes around the 7,500 inhabitants threshold. For this, we follow the empirical
strategy explained in Section 4.3.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 plot the local polynomial estimate of the elasticity of, respectively, the
average quantity sold and price charged. The former displays an increase right after the
threshold, though its statistical significance is poor, the latter displays a decrease after 7,500
inhabitants. In particular, consistently with the results of the naive stratification of model
A, the elasticity is slightly positive and significant when the law imposes a single pharmacy
in the City, and declines to zero when the law allows for an additional competitor.
Turning to regression results, Table 4.7 reports results for quantity and prices considering
different time spans to measure newborns (as with model A) and different windows around
the threshold and polynomials in population (as with model B). Again, here we focus on the
ITT effect, leaving IV results to Section 4.9. We fail to identify a significant positive effect of
the threshold on elasticity of sold quantities: although the point estimate is always positive,
it is never statistically different from zero. For what regards price, instead, being right above
the threshold induces a significant decline in its elasticity to an increase of newborns.
This finding is consistent with the theoretical model that predicts that an increase in the
number of competitors reduces the positive effect of uninformed buyers on the average price.
4.9 Discussion of alternative interpretations and ro-
bustness checks
We now discuss and check the robustness of our results against several possible alternative
explanations.
First, both the theoretical model and our empirical strategy crucially relies on the assump-
tion of non-increasing marginal costs for the pharmacy. Although we cannot directly observe
the price paid by pharmacists to wholesalers, we are confident that this assumption holds.
Indeed, it is well-known that pharmacies do not experience shortages of products, as sup-
pliers perform deliveries more than once per day, and that wholesalers usually use pricing
schemes that are either constant or declining. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, in-
creasing marginal costs may represent a relevant confounding factor for model A, but does
not explain why the elasticity of price to newborns changes discontinuously at the 7,500
threshold.
Results of model A may be biased if log-newborns displays autocorrelation, even after par-
tialling out both City and aggregate time trends.18 To rule out this hypothesis, we included
lags of newborns in the specification. The results, summarized in Table 4.8, give us two
important messages. First, even if we add lagged values, the coefficient on log-newborns at
time t remains positive and significant and the point estimate is virtually unchanged (i.e., we
are reassured that the possible positive autocorrelation does not explain the result obtained).
Second, newborns have a positive and significant effect up to 10 months before the present.
This implies that parents of newborns have a relatively slow learning curve, so that the ‘rent
extraction effect’ persists over time.
In model A, we studied the effect of changes in newborns with respect to the City average.
This empirical strategy sums up to assuming that there is no correlation between changes
in uninformed consumers and changes in informed consumers at time t. We consider a stock
18Notice, however, that the direction of the bias would depend on whether the autocorrelation is positive
or negative and whether the effect of lagged values of newborns on price is positive or negative.
of informed consumers, whose stability over time is supported by the evidence of Table 4.8.
Given the time parents need to acquire information we can claim that when they become
informed they exit to this market (children no more need this kind of products).
Despite that the difficulty to clearly identify the group of informed consumers remains. In
Table 4.9, we study the effect of a change in the share between newborns and the overall
population, under the assumption that total population is a good proxy for the set of in-
formed consumers. Results are robust to this new specification of the independent variable
of interest.
In Section 4.8 we have shown ITT results for the effect of an increase in competitors on the
elasticity of quantity and price to newborns. Given that there is substantial non-compliance
to the assignment rule, and in particular that municipalities are likely to have more than 1
pharmacy right below the threshold, we may expect the coefficients obtained to be a very
conservative measure of the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). In Table 4.10, we ex-
ploited the fuzzy nature of the RD design and instrument the number of pharmacies with
the threshold. As expected, the point estimates of the effect are nearly doubled (particu-
larly for prices). The IV estimate, however, coupled with the small sample size reduces the
significance, which is reached solely at the 10% level.
So far, we have estimated the average price charged and sold quantity at the City level
using pharmacies sampled by Newline. The Newline sample, however, is far from being
randomly chosen among the reference universe. Comparisons of socio-demographic charac-
teristics measured between Newline and non-Newline pharmacies shows that the latter are
usually placed in richer and more populated municipalities. Although we do not claim that
our result is nationally representative, sample selection may represent a relevant bias for the
RD results. Indeed, this may be the case if the Newline systematically selects its sample
within municipalities: in this case, as the number of pharmacies within a municipality in-
crease the bias between the expected value measured within Newline sample and the real
mean value at the municipal level would increase.19 To check the robustness of our finding
to the sample selection, we focus on the subsample of Cities for which Newline has sampled
100% of pharmacies. Tables 4.11 and 4.12 estimate model A and C in this subsample. Re-
sults are very similar to those obtained with the total sample.
Results obtained from model A may be simply spurious correlations if the time-series of both
log-price (or quantity) and log-newborns display serial correlation in the demeaned values.
We performed several tests for identifying both serial correlation and unit-root in these se-
ries, and the results are reassuring. In particular, a Harris-Tzavalis test rejects the null of
unit-root for all three variables. Similar results are obtained with the Levin-Lin-Chu test
and the Im-Pesaran-Shin test. Wooldridge test fail to reject the null of no-serial correlation
for the residuals of a regression of log-newborns on time and City fixed effects. Conversely,
log-price and log-quantity do display serial correlation in the residuals, but we take care of
it by using cluster-robust standard errors in all models.
Finally, so far we did not consider the role of other types of stores in which some of the
products included in the basket can be purchased. Although it is not possible to control for
the number of other shops in the municipality, because this variable is endogenous due to
free entry and exit from the market, we can nonetheless test whether there are differences in
the number of grocery stores at the threshold. At present, we have only information on mass
retail channels, and for the convenience stores that are allowed to sell over-the-counter drugs
(so-called ‘parafarmacie’). Notice, however, that child hygiene products may be sold even
by smaller groceries for which we do not have any information, so far. Figure 4.8 shows the
local polynomial smoothed estimate of the number of mass retail stores (upper panel) and
‘parafarmacie’ (lower panel) in 2010. As it can be seen, there are no significant differences
at the threshold.
19For example, assume that in each municipality Newline samples the top 10% pharmacies on the basis
of the distribution of monthly sold volumes (price-per-quantity). Obviously, when there is one pharmacy in
the City both the expected price and quantity is measured consistently. As the number of pharmacies in the
City increases, however, the bias will increase according to the City-level distribution of sold volumes.
4.10 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided new evidence on the role of consumers’ information in the
retail sector, and its interplay with competition among sellers. Theory predicts that an inflow
of uninformed consumers should have a positive effect on the average price charged by sellers.
This effect, known in the literature as the ‘rent extraction effect’, is counterbalanced by the
‘business stealing effect’ (i.e., the incentive to reduce price in order to gain a bigger market
share). The relative strength of the former should decline as the number of competitors
increases.
We gather data for a large sample of Italian pharmacies, and estimate the effect of a positive
shock in the number of newborns on the average price at the City level, for a basket of child
hygiene products. Consistently with the model, an increase in newborns has a positive effect
on price.
To study the effect of competition on the elasticity of price to newborns, we exploit a
legislative feature of the Italian pharmacy market: the law imposes that Cities under 7,500
inhabitants should have a single pharmacy, while Cities right above this threshold should
have two pharmacies. We exploit the fuzzy regression discontinuity design provided by this
law and estimate how the effect of newborns on price changes around the threshold. As
the model predicted, we find that the elasticity is positive when the average number of
competitors is lower, and becomes zero at the right of the 7,500 threshold.
4.11 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Top products in the basket - by average monthly sold quantity and by average
price
Name Description Price Quantity
Top-5 by Sold Quantity
Salviette Assorbello Hygienic Towels 2.04 39.94
GP Baby Pasta all’Ossido di Zinco Zinc-Oxyde Paste 4.91 23.3
Bluedermin Pasta BB 100ml Diaper Change Ointment 5.83 17.21
Trudi Baby Care Salviettine Hygienic Towels 2.07 16.53
GP Baby Detergente Cleansing Cream 5.02 15.3
Top-5 by Price
Soin de Fee 24-Hour Baby Cream 50ml Barrier Cream 45 0.21
Vidermina 3 Soluzione 1000ml Cleansing Cream 40.32 0.01
Buba Shampoo e Bagno Shampoo and Bath Foam 37.61 0.04
Unilen Gel 15ml Barrier Cream 36.06 0.11
Protezione Solare Bambini Vichy Suntan Cream 30.9 0.02
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics - 2007-2010.
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Price Index 1 0.03 0.8 1.25
Quantity Index 0.8 0.48 0.004 7.3
Sold Quantity 68 55 0 808
Newborns 9 0.09 0 819
No. of Pharmacies 6 27.6 1 719
No. of Obs. 51326
Table 4.3: Mean of control variables, by treatment group
Population Population p-value
∈ [7000, 7500[ ∈ [7500,8000[
Log-Newborns 1.80 1.81 0.88
(0.31) (0.21)
Municipal Area 32.57 46.10 0.27
(47.84) (46.17)
Northern Italy 0.63 0.77 0.21
(0.49) (0.43)
Pop. Growth -0.006 -0.009 0.87
(from peak to 2007) (.08) (.04)
No. of Obs. 48 22
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; the p-value is obtained from a two-tiers test on equality of means (assuming unequal
variances).
Table 4.4: Fixed-effects estimates of Model A
Log Quantity Log Price
Index Index
Panel A: newborns measured at time t
Log Newborns 0.0177 0.0005
(0.0029)*** (0.0001)***
Constant -0.3473 -0.0185
(0.0207)*** (0.0010)***
Time effects Yes Yes
No.Obs. 57289 57289
No.Munic 1671 1671
Panel B: newborns measured at time t and t− 1
Log Newborns 0.0297 0.0009
(0.0048)*** (0.0003)***
Constant -0.3260 -0.0165
(0.0148)*** (0.0009)***
Time effects Yes Yes
No.Obs. 56821 56821
No.Munic 1671 1671
Panel C: newborns at time t, t− 1 and t− 2
Log Newborns 0.0364 0.0012
(0.0066)*** (0.0004)***
Constant -0.4199 0.0069
(0.0211)*** (0.0013)***
Time effects Yes Yes
No.Obs. 56353 56353
No.Munic 1671 1671
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered at municipality level) in parentheses.
Table 4.5: Fixed-effects estimates of Model A - Cities with one pharmacy VS Cities with
more than one pharmacy.
1 pharmacy > 1 pharmacies
Log Quantity Log Price Log Quantity Log Price
Index Index Index Index
Panel A: newborns measured at time t
Log newborn 0.0186 0.0006 0.0168 0.0001
(0.0037)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0002)
Constant -0.3376 0.0029 -0.1701 -0.0147
(0.0262)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0331)*** (0.0020)***
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
No.Obs. 22798 22798 34491 34491
No.Munic 723 723 978 978
Panel B: newborns measured at time t and t− 1
Log newborn 0.0300 0.0011 0.0311 -0.0001
(0.0060)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0005)
Constant -0.4843 -0.0027 -0.1512 -0.0127
(0.0188)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0019)***
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
No.Obs. 22567 22567 34254 34254
No.Munic 723 723 978 978
Panel C: newborns at time t, t− 1 and t− 2
Log newborn 0.0385 0.0016 0.0351 -0.0004
(0.0080)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0110)*** (0.0008)
Constant -0.5824 0.0110 -0.3103 0.0092
(0.0212)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0421)*** (0.0029)***
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
No.Obs. 22336 22336 34017 34017
No.Munic 723 723 978 978
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered at municipality level) in parentheses.
Table 4.6: Regression discontinuity results of Model B
No. of Log-Quant. Log-Quant. Log-Price Log-Price
Pharmacies Index Index Index Index
Panel A: Local linear estimate - ± 1,500 inhabs.
Thresh. Dummy 0.520 -0.125 -0.058 0.005 -0.001
(0.168)*** (0.114) (0.106) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.708 -0.146 -0.600 0.002 -0.004
(0.123)*** (0.076)* (0.259)** (0.005) (0.017)
Controls N N Y N Y
No. of Obs. 235 235 235 235 235
Panel B: Spline 2nd - ± 2,000 inhabs.
Thresh. Dummy 0.441 -0.038 0.019 0.008 0.000
(0.223)** (0.146) (0.138) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 0.754 -0.155 -0.604 0.001 -0.004
(0.165)*** (0.101) (0.215)*** (0.006) (0.015)
Controls N N Y N Y
No. of Obs. 296 296 296 296 296
Panel C: Spline 3rd - ± 3,000 inhabs.
Thresh. Dummy 0.557 -0.032 0.010 0.005 -0.001
(0.246)** (0.157) (0.150) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 0.727 -0.179 -0.607 0.001 -0.001
(0.178)*** (0.107)* (0.173)*** (0.006) (0.010)
Controls N N Y N Y
No. of Obs. 462 462 462 462 462
Panel D: Spline 4th - ± 4,000 inhabs.
Thresh. Dummy 0.568 0.012 0.039 0.004 -0.003
(0.270)** (0.170) (0.164) (0.011) (0.010)
Constant 0.738 -0.179 -0.462 0.000 -0.009
(0.192)*** (0.113) (0.147)*** (0.007) (0.010)
Controls N N Y N Y
No. of Obs. 631 631 631 631 631
Notes: heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log-newborns, municipal area, northern Italy
dummy, and population growth rate between the population peak and year 2007.
Table 4.7: Regression discontinuity results of Model C
Elasticity to Elasticity to Elasticity to
NBorns at time NBorns at time NBorns at time
t t, t− 1 t, t− 1, t− 2
Log-Quant Log-Price Log-Quant Log-Price Log-Quant Log-Price
Index Index Index Index Index Index
Panel A: Local linear estimate - ± 1,500 inhabs.
Thresh. Dummy 0.032 -0.005 0.037 -0.004 0.037 -0.004
(0.036) (0.002)** (0.028) (0.002)** (0.028) (0.002)**
Constant -0.003 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.002
(0.021) (0.001)* (0.019) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001)
No. of Obs. 227 227 227 227 227 227
Panel B: Spline 2nd - ± 2,000 inhabs.
Thresh. Dummy 0.006 -0.006 0.039 -0.006 0.039 -0.006
(0.047) (0.003)** (0.040) (0.002)** (0.040) (0.003)**
Constant -0.001 0.003 0.018 0.001 0.018 0.002
(0.024) (0.002)* (0.025) (0.001) (0.025) (0.001)*
No. of Obs. 288 288 288 288 288 288
Panel C: Spline 3rd - ± 3,000 inhabs.
Thresh. Dummy 0.017 -0.007 0.057 -0.006 0.057 -0.006
(0.049) (0.003)*** (0.040) (0.002)** (0.040) (0.003)**
Constant -0.003 0.003 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.003
(0.024) (0.002)* (0.026) (0.001) (0.026) (0.001)*
No. of Obs. 454 454 454 454 454 454
Panel D: Spline 4th - ± 4,000 inhabs.
Thresh. Dummy 0.017 -0.007 0.066 -0.006 0.066 -0.006
(0.053) (0.003)** (0.044) (0.003)** (0.044) (0.003)**
Constant -0.006 0.003 0.015 0.002 0.015 0.003
(0.025) (0.002)* (0.028) (0.001) (0.028) (0.001)*
No. of Obs. 621 621 621 621 621 621
Notes: heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. The municipality-specific elasticities are obtained by (i)
regressing the dependent variables on municipality and time fixed effects, and (ii) regressing the residuals obtained on log-
newborns for each municipality.
Table 4.8: Effects of changes in log-new born on log price
Log priceindex Log priceindex Log priceindex Log priceindex
Log Newborn 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)**
Log Newborn(t-1) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)** (0.0002)*
Log Newborn(t-2) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0002)* (0.0002)* (0.0002)* (0.0002)
Log Newborn(t-3) 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)
Log Newborn(t-4) 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)**
Log Newborn(t-5) 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)**
Log Newborn(t-6) 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)***
Log Newborn(t-7) 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)***
Log Newborn(t-8) 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)***
Log Newborn(t-9) 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)***
Log Newborn(t-10) 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0002)** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)**
Log Newborn(t-11) 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0002)* (0.0002)
Log Newborn(t-12) 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log Newborn(t-13) 0.0000
(0.0002)
Log Newborn(t-14) 0.0002
(0.0002)
Log Newborn(t-15) -0.0000
(0.0002)
Time effect Yes Yes yes Yes
Constant -0.0413 -0.0519 -0.0560 -0.0548
(0.0084)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0172)***
No.Obs. 5.18e+04 5.03e+04 4.87e+04 4.63e+04
No.Munic 1634 1634 1634 1634
Notes: Fixed effect estimation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered at municipality level) in parentheses.
Table 4.9: Effects of changes in log-newborns on log-quantity and log-price - newborns
measured as ratio of total population
Log Quantity Log Price
Index Index
Panel A: newborns measured at time t
Log(Newborns/Pop) 0.01785 0.00046
(0.00286)*** (0.00014)***
Constant -0.10487 -0.01210
(0.02228)*** (0.00114)***
Time effects Yes Yes
No.Obs. 5.73e+04 5.73e+04
No.Munic 1.67e+03 1.67e+03
Panel B: newborns measured at time t and t− 1
Log(Newborns/Pop) 0.03005 0.00081
(0.00482)*** (0.00027)***
Constant -0.05582 -0.00903
(0.03336)* (0.00191)***
Time effects Yes Yes
No.Obs. 5.68e+04 5.68e+04
No.Munic 1.67e+03 1.67e+03
Panel C: newborns at time t, t− 1 and t− 2
Log(Newborns/Pop) 0.03690 0.00110
(0.00658)*** (0.00040)***
Constant -0.08784 0.01704
(0.04096)** (0.00249)***
Time effects Yes Yes
No.Obs. 5.64e+04 5.64e+04
No.Munic 1.67e+03 1.67e+03
Notes: Fixed effect estimates. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered at municipality level) in parentheses.
Table 4.10: Regression discontinuity results of Model 3 - 2SLS results
Elasticity to Elasticity to Elasticity to
NBorns at time NBorns at time NBorns at time
t t, t− 1 t, t− 1, t− 2
Log-Quant Log-Price Log-Quant Log-Price Log-Quant Log-Price
Index Index Index Index Index Index
Panel A: Local linear estimate - ± 1,500 inhabs.
No. of Pharm. 0.068 -0.010 0.078 -0.009 0.078 -0.009
(0.084) (0.005)* (0.067) (0.005)* (0.067) (0.005)*
Constant -0.052 0.009 -0.048 0.007 -0.048 0.008
(0.075) (0.005)* (0.063) (0.005) (0.063) (0.005)*
No. of Obs. 227 227 227 227 227 227
Panel B: Spline 2nd - ± 2,000 inhabs.
No. of Pharm. 0.032 -0.013 0.086 -0.011 0.086 -0.013
(0.105) (0.008) (0.098) (0.008) (0.098) (0.009)
Constant -0.026 0.013 -0.049 0.010 -0.049 0.013
(0.095) (0.008) (0.096) (0.007) (0.096) (0.008)
No. of Obs. 288 288 288 288 288 288
Panel C: Spline 3rd - ± 3,000 inhabs.
No. of Pharm. 0.034 -0.014 0.115 -0.011 0.115 -0.012
(0.105) (0.008)* (0.098) (0.007) (0.098) (0.007)*
Constant -0.028 0.013 -0.073 0.010 -0.073 0.011
(0.092) (0.008)* (0.098) (0.007) (0.098) (0.007)
No. of Obs. 454 454 454 454 454 454
Panel D: Spline 4th - ± 4,000 inhabs.
No. of Pharm. 0.033 -0.014 0.131 -0.011 0.131 -0.012
(0.111) (0.008)* (0.114) (0.007) (0.114) (0.008)
Constant -0.031 0.013 -0.083 0.010 -0.083 0.012
(0.098) (0.008) (0.114) (0.007) (0.114) (0.008)
No. of Obs. 621 621 621 621 621 621
Notes: heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. The municipality-specific elasticities are obtained by (i)
regressing the dependent variables on municipality and time fixed effects, and (ii) regressing the residuals obtained on log-
newborns for each municipality.
Table 4.11: Fixed-effects estimates of Model A - municipalities in which Newline samples all
pharmacies
Log Quantity Log Price
Index Index
Panel A: newborns measured at time t
Log newborn 0.0191 0.0006
(0.0036)*** (0.0002)***
Constant -0.3234 0.0026
(0.0252)*** (0.0010)**
Time effect Yes Yes
No.Obs. 24743 24743
No.Munic 792 792
Panel B: newborns measured at time t and t− 1
Log newborn 0.0311 0.0011
(0.0058)*** (0.0003)***
Constant -0.4664 -0.0028
(0.0181)*** (0.0008)***
Time effect Yes Yes
No.Obs. 24542 24542
No.Munic 792 792
Panel C: newborns at time t, t− 1 and t− 2
Log newborn 0.0399 0.0016
(0.0078)*** (0.0005)***
Constant -0.6439 0.0123
(0.0199)*** (0.0010)***
Time effect Yes Yes
No.Obs. 24261 24261
No.Munic 792 792
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered at municipality level) in parentheses.
Table 4.12: Regression discontinuity results of Model 3 - municipalities in which Newline
samples all pharmacies
No. of Log-Price Log-Price Log-Quant Log-Quant
Pharmacies ITT IV ITT IV
Thresh. Dummy 1.012 -0.003 0.011
(0.154)*** (0.001)* (0.031)
No. of Pharm. -0.003 0.011
(0.001)* (0.031)
Constant 0.143 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.051)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.019) (0.022)
No. of Obs. 202 201 201 201 201
Notes: heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. The municipality-specific elasticities are obtained by (i)
regressing the dependent variables on municipality and time fixed effects, and (ii) regressing the residuals obtained on log-
newborns for each municipality.
Figure 4.1: Trends in average quantity and price indexes of hygiene products (left panels),
and histograms of the residuals of a regression of quantity and price on City and time fixed
effects (right panels)
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Figure 4.2: Trends in average newborns per City (left panel), and histograms of the residuals
of a regression of log-newborns on City and time fixed effects (right panel)
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Figure 4.3: Scatter plot and local polynomial smoothing of the number of pharmacies - actual population in 2006 and maximum
population over the period 1961-2006
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Figure 4.4: Scatter plot and local polynomial smoothing of the (log) quantity index around
the threshold
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Figure 4.5: Scatter plot and local polynomial smoothing of the (log) price index around the
threshold
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Figure 4.6: Scatter plot and local polynomial smoothing of the municipality-specific elasticity
of quantities to newborns
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Figure 4.7: Scatter plot and local polynomial smoothing of the municipality-specific elasticity
of prices to newborns
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Figure 4.8: Scatter plot and local polynomial smoothing of the number of mass retail stores
and parafarmacie around the threshold
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Abstract
We study the effect of an immigrant inflow at the neighborhood level on house prices within
cities. We develop a spatial equilibrium model that shows how immigration shock to a part
of the city propagates to the rest of the city through changes in local amenities and local
prices. On the empirical side, we rely on two different empirical strategies. First, we collect
data at the neighbourhood level for a sample of main Italian cities and we analyze the impact
of immigration on natives’ residential choice and house price dynamics. We find that there
is a negative relationship between changes in native population and changes in immigrant
population across neighbourhoods; we also find some evidence that price growth is lower than
the average in those neighbourhoods where immigrants settle. Second, we extend the analysis
to all Italian municipalities and we investigate the impact of immigration on indicators of
city price distribution. We find that immigration causes an increase in the average price.
This effect, however, is driven by the upper two deciles of the price distribution: the effect
on immigration on lower prices is never statistically different from zero.
5.1 Introduction
Economists have recently begun studying the effect of immigration on house prices. Starting
from the seminal work of Albert Saiz [58], empirical analyses have shown that an inflow
of immigrants has a positive effect on rental and house prices at the municipal level. This
can be considered a simple consequence of an increase in housing demand in the presence
of a positively sloped supply curve. However, the average effect at the municipal level may
hinder opposing forces within the city boundaries. Indeed, immigrant inflows may reduce
the price in the neighborhood where they settle by inducing natives to move in other areas
of the city. The resulting average price at the municipal level may still grow, but the effect
on house price distribution may be different. Identifying this effect is particularly relevant
for its positive and normative implications in terms of both urban segregation and social
interactions between natives and foreigners, as well as for the study of real estate market
dynamics.
In this paper, we provide both theoretical and empirical preliminary findings on the effect
of an inflow of immigrants on native flight and house prices within the city.
To examine the effects of an immigration shock in a spatial equilibrium framework and to
guide the empirical investigation, we develop a theoretical model a` la Rosen-Roback.2 The
model clarifies how a localized immigrant shock to a neighborhood propagates to the rest of
the city through changes in local amenities and local prices.
On the empirical side, we rely on two different empirical strategies. First, we investigate the
causal impact of immigration on indicators of city price distribution. To address endogeneity,
we adopt an IV strategy which uses historical enclaves of immigrants across municipalities
to predict current settlements (Card [11]). We find that a 10 percent shock to the immigrant
population increases the spread between maximum and minimum prices by 5.3 percentage
point. A quantile analysis shows that the effect of immigration is significantly positive only
2The models by Rosen [57] and Roback [56] are the most frequently used general equilibrium models to
analyze shocks to local economies.
for higher deciles of the price distribution. Thus, we provide evidence that immigrant in-
flows lead to a relatively slower house price appreciation in poorer neighborhoods. Using
this strategy, however, we cannot identify where immigrants settle, and whether there are
evidence of native flight from areas affected by migration towards other areas of the city.
In order to do so, we are going to pursue a second empirical strategy. In the future devel-
opment of the paper, we will focus on a smaller sample of 19 main Italian municipalities
for which we are gathering data on immigrant inflows and demographic dynamics at the
administrative district level (so called “quartieri”). In this paper, we develop an empirical
strategy which allows us to identify the effect of an immigrant inflow at the district level on
native mobility and on house prices, taking into consideration the (likely) violation of the
Stable Unit-Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). In addition, we provide preliminary
OLS estimates showing that an inflow of immigrants in a district reduces the number of
native population living in it, and reduces the growth rate of prices vis-a`-vis other parts of
the city.
This research contibutes to the literature on urban segregation and on the impact of immi-
gration on house prices. For what regards the former, economists have mostly studied the
determinants and consequences of the emergence of ghettos. See, among the others, Cutler
et al. [17], Bayer et al. [6], Durlauf [23], Card et al. [12]3
So far, the effect of immigration on house prices have been almost uniquely studied by
looking at the average price at the municipal level as the variable of interest. Researches
performed in several OECD countries have confirmed that there is a significant and positive
effect on the expected price, though the magnitude of this effect may change.4 As far as
3Cutler et al. [17] examine segregation in American cities. They argue that in the past segregation was
a product of collective actions taken by whites to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. By 1990, legal
barriers were replaced by “decentralized racism”: whites pay more than blacks to live in predominantly white
areas. Card et al. [12] find that population flows exhibit tipping-like behavior: once the minoriy share in a
neighborhood exceeds a “tipping point”, all whites leave. Bayer et al. [6] analyze segregation patterns in the
San Francisco Bay Area and conclude that racial differences in socio-demographic characteristics explain a
considerable amount of the observed segregation.
4In the US, Saiz [59] founds that a raise in immigrant stock that equals 1% of the city population
raises prices by 2%. A similar finding is obtained for New Zealand by Stillman and Mare [64]. Gonzales and
Ortega [28] estimate a 3% effect for Spain, Degen and Fischer [21] find a effect 2.7% elasticity for Switzerland,
we know, Saiz and Wachter [60] is the only paper that examines the distributional impact
of immigration on house prices. They focus on US metropolitan areas and use two census
waves to document that housing values have grown relatively more slowly in neighborhoods
characterized by immigrant settlements.
Most of the existing literature in both fields concerns the US, whereas evidence for Europe
is much more limited. Moreover, almost all of the previous studies have used decennial
census data, thus focusing on the long-term dynamics of segregation and house prices. We
provide novel evidence of the displacement effect of immigration on natives in the Italian
context, and study the effect of immigration on housing in a markedly different setting with
respect to the US market. Indeed, Italy is characterized by stickier supply of housing and
much less developed capital markets. The pure effect of a demand shock may then be more
pronounced. In addition, we identify short/medium-term effects using yearly observations,
rather than decennial data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we develop a spatial equi-
librium model to inform our empirical exercises. In Section 5.3, we describe the data and
provide some descriptive analysis on urbanization patterns, house price dynamics and their
relationship with immigrant settlements. In Section 5.4 we present evidence of the effect of
an immigrant inflow on measures of city price dispersion. In Section 5.5 we introduce our
second empirical exercise based on data at the neighborhood level for a subset of Italian
metropolitan areas. Section 5.6 provides preliminary concluding remarks.
De Blasio and D’Ignazio [19] estimate 0.5% effect for Italy. Akbari and Aydede [2] study the Canadian real
estate market, and they are the only paper that fails to identify any significant effect.
5.2 Theoretical model
5.2.1 Assumptions and equilibrium in the housing market
Consider a city composed of 2 neighborhoods, s ∈ {1, 2}. Each individual i located in a
neighborhood s maximizes her utility function:
Uis = As
C1−αi L
α
i
(1− α)1−α αα
(5.1)
where As are the amenities in neighborhood s, Ci and Li are the amount of, respectively,
tradable good and housing consumed by i.
Using the tradable good as the numeraire, and assuming that income does not depend on
location within the city, budget constraint is Ci + rsLi = Yi, where rs and Yi represent,
respectively, rents prevailing in area s and individual income.
Standard utility maximization leads to the following marshallian demands:
L∗i =
αYi
rs
(5.2)
C∗i = (1− α)Yi (5.3)
There are two types of workers: natives and immigrants. The total number of natives in the
city is N , a share ω of which locates in area 1. Natives are free to move across neighborhoods
and their income is equal to Y . We assume that a mass m of immigrants locate in the city
and concentrate in area 2. Immigrant income is equal to γY , with γ ∈ (0, 1].
Aggregate housing demand for each area is therefore:
Ld1 = ωN
αY
r1
(5.4)
Ld2 = [(1− ω)N + γm]
αY
r2
(5.5)
Neighborhood s housing supply is assumed to be equal to:
Los = βsrs (5.6)
where βs is the price elasticity of housing services. βs is allowed to be different across
locations, since neighborhoods may be characterized by different space constraints. Indeed,
housing supply in a historical city center (e.g., Rome or Venice) is much more constrained
than the one in sprawled peripheries.
Equilibrium prices are determined by the equations (5.4), (5.5), and (5.6):
r∗1 =
(
ωN
αY
β1
) 1
2
(5.7)
r∗2 =
{
[(1− ω)N + γm]
αY
β2
} 1
2
(5.8)
5.2.2 Where do natives locate?
Natives are free to move across locations. This implies that in equilibrium the utility levels
equalize across locations.
Given Cobb-Douglas preferences, indirect utilities are determined by the product between
real wages and amenities. We now assume that natives’ appreciation of local amenities is
influenced by migration. On one hand, natives might be concerned by a deterioration of
local standards of living due to an increase in crime or a crowding effect of local indivisible
public goods (e.g., parks, libraries, transports). On the other hand, natives perception of
local amenities in response to migration can increase due to cultural diversity and a rise in
the variety of local public goods (e.g., ethnic restaurants).
We assume that amenities in neighborhood 1, unaffected by migration, are fixed and equal
to A, while amenities in area 2 are a function of migration, A(m), whose derivative depends
on the balance between the above described forces.
The equalization between indirect utilities leads to the following equilibrium condition:
A(
ωN
β1
)α
2
=
A(m)[
(1−ω)N+γm
β2
]α
2
(5.9)
Equilibrium area 1 share of natives is therefore:
ω∗ =
N + γm
N
φ(m) (5.10)
where φ(m) =
A
2
α
β2
A
2
α
β2
+
A(m)
2
α
β1
∈ (0, 1) represents the amenities effect of migration on population
location.
The term N+γm
N
can be interpreted, instead, as an income effect: the crowding out of natives
due to he increased demand of housing services by immigrants.
The native flight phenomenon (i.e., the relocation of native population ot other neighbor-
hoods due to immigration) can be computed as:
∂ω∗
∂m
=
γ
N
φ(m) +
N + γm
N
φ′(m) (5.11)
The first term on the right-hand side represents the change in the income effect, that is
always positive. Note that the larger the immigrants’ income the stronger this effect and,
thus, the native flight. The second term is the amenities effect, which is positive whenever
migration decreases perceived amenities in the area (i.e., if ∂A(m)/∂m < 0). In other words,
the price effect is emphasized (attenuated) by the amenities effect whenever immigrants
decrease (increase) local amenities in area 2.
5.2.3 Migration and rents: local and average effects
It is now easy to assess the effect of migration on local rents. By deriving the log of (5.7)
and (5.8) by m, we obtain:
∂r∗1
∂m
=
1
2
[
γ
N + γm
+
φ′(m)
φ(m)
]
(5.12)
∂r∗2
∂m
=
1
2
[
γ
N + γm
+
φ′(m)
1− φ(m)
]
(5.13)
Note that the income effect is the same in both areas, since the propagation of the migration
shock from area 2 to area 1 is immediate due to the free mobility of natives. Income effect
in area 1 is attenuated (emphasized) if migration increase (reduce) amenities in area 2. In
other words, whenever migration generates a reduction in neighborhood 2 amenities, native
workers decide to migrate and pay higher rents in area 1 to “escape” foreigners. The effect
on area 2 is just the opposite. Whenever immigrants deteriorate local amenities housing
costs in the area hit by migration grow less than the other areas of the city due to the native
flight effect (i.e., larger residential migration from area 2 to area 1).
It is now possible to compute the city-level average rents and assess the effects of an inflow
of immigrants. By using (5.6), (5.7), and (5.8), city-level rents are equal to:
r∗ = 2
[
(N + γm)αY
φ(m)β1 + [1− φ(m)] β2
] 1
2
(5.14)
By taking logs and deriving by m, we obtain the average rent elasticity to migration (whose
empirical counterpart has been estimated for the US by Saiz [59]):
∂r∗
∂m
=
1
2
[
γ
N + γm
+
(β2 − β1)φ
′(m)
φ(m)β1 + [1− φ(m)] β2
]
(5.15)
As before, the first term in braces is the income effect on rents. However, at city level the
spatial distribution of immigrants matters. In particular, the expression (β2 − β1)φ
′ signals
that the effects on amenities and the elasticity of housing supply play an important role.
First, note that whenever housing supply is the same across neighborhoods, the second term
in braces cancels out. This implies that amenities have an effect on average prices only if
neighborhoods are characterized by different supply elasticities.
We can then distinguish four cases:
i. β2 > β1 and φ
′(m) > 0. In this case immigrants reduce amenities and area 2 is
characterized by a larger elasticity in the housing supply (i.e., immigrants settle in the
periphery). In this case, natives leave area 2 and move to the area characerized by a
more rigid supply curve, thus increasing local and average prices.
ii. β2 < β1 and φ
′(m) > 0. In this case immigrants reduce amenities and area 2 is
characterized by a smaller elasticity in the housing supply (i.e., immigrants settle in
the historical city centers). In this case, natives leave area 2 and move to the area
characterized by a less rigid supply curve, thus attenuating the income effect.
iii. β2 > β1 and φ
′(m) < 0. In this case immigrants increase amenities and area 2 is
characterized by a larger elasticity of the housing supply (periphery). Natives leave
area 1 and move to an area characterized by a less rigid supply curve, attenutating the
income effect.
iv. β2 < β1 and φ
′(m) < 0. Immigrants increase amenities and area 2 has a smaller
elasticity of housing supply (city center). Native-flight from area 1, then emphasizes
the income effect.
5.3 Data and descriptive analysis
Data on house prices are obtained from the Italian Land Registry Office (“Agenzia del
Territorio” - AdT). The AdT has divided each Italian municipality into microzones (neigh-
borhoods that are homogeneous in socioeconomic terms). For each microzone, AdT collects
information on house prices by type of house (villas and cottages, mansions, economic houses,
typical houses), and the state of the building (poor, normal, excellent). We focus on eco-
nomic houses (the most widespread housing typology) in a normal state (because of the
very limited number of observations available for poor or excellent houses). Because most
municipalities are composed of very few microzones, in order to obtain stronger measures
of variability we aggregate observations at the local labor system level. There are 640 local
labor systems for which we have information on house prices from 2003 to 2009.5
Figure 5.1 reports trends in several price indicators, averaged at the local labor system level,
over the period 2003-2009. The left figure shows that the average house price has increased
sharply in the last seven years, with the notable exception of 2009: in that year the crisis has
lowered the average house price back to its 2007 level. At the same time, the ratio between
the maximum and the minimum price within the city (middle figure) has lowered markedly.
Finally, the coefficient of variation of prices (measured at the municipal level) reported a
similar downward trend, which somehow reverts in 2009.
Data on immigrants and natives at the local labor system level is provided by the Italian
National Statistical Office. Note that here we consider solely official immigrants.6
We now provide some descriptive results for the phenomena we are studying. Figure 5.2
shows the correlation between the change in immigrant population at the municipal level
and the corresponding change in native population. The linear fit shows that there is a
slightly positive correlation between the two variables. The regression coefficient, however,
is rather small (0.004) and not significant at any conventional level.
A simple descriptive analysis confirms that immigration dynamics are strongly correlated
with house prices. Indeed, Figure 5.3 shows immigration has grown more in municipalities
5The average municipal population in Italy is 7,690 inhabitants. Aggregating observations at the local
labor system level yields an average size of 84,305 inhabitants per zone: a dimension more similar to standard
U.S. metropolitan areas.
6Note, however, that the presence of unofficial immigrants would not bias our empirical estimate if they
are proportional to official immigrants and the constant of proportionality is the result of a municipality-
per-year fixed effect (for which we are able to control) and a stochastic term. See Bianchi et al. [9] for a
discussion and some empirical evidence on this issue.
where beginning-of-the-period price was lower. On the other side, however, the municipal-
ities in which immigration has grown more have been characterized by a stronger increase
in house prices over the 2003-2009 period (Figure 5.4). Finally, immigration is only weakly
correlated with a decrease in the coefficient of variation of prices within the local labor sys-
tem (Figure 5.5).
All these correlations, however, are likely to be largely spurious, due to the presence of omit-
ted variables (e.g., the business cycle) affecting both immigration and house prices, as well
as because of reverse causality (immigrants may be pulled by housing opportunities). To
deal with both issues, in the next Section we develop an instrumental variable approach.
5.4 The effect of immigration on house price distribu-
tion
We start estimating the following model for the price indicator PIit measured in local labor
system i and year t:
PIit = α + βMit + λt + ai + εit (5.16)
where Mit is the log of the number of immigrants, λt is a year fixed-effect, and ai is a local
labor system fixed effect.
Table 5.1 reports results from the OLS estimate of 5.16. The first column shows that an
increase in 1% in the stock of immigrants raises the mean price by around 0.13%. This
positive mean effect has been identified by the preceding literature in most OECD countries,
including Italy (De Blasio and D’Ignazio [19]). As the subsequent columns show, however,
this effect is not uniform over the price distribution. The effect is somehow more pronounced
for the maximum price (which increases by 0.137% for a 1% raise in immigrant stock) than
for the minimum price (which increases by 0.12%). The difference between the maximum
and minimum prices, then, increases significantly. The increase in the coefficient of variance
related to an increase in the immigrant stock, however, fails to be significantly different from
zero at any conventional level.
The OLS results, however, may suffer from the afore-mentioned endogeneity and reverse
causality issues. To address these problems, we use an IV strategy that exploits historical
enclaves and current total aggregate stocks in Italy to predict current stocks of immigrants
at the municipal level. Following Card [11], for each municipality i the expected value of Mt
is given by:
Mˆit = β0 + β1
∑
n
Shni,1991 ×M
n
t + λt + LLMi (5.17)
where Shni,1991 is the share of immigrants of nationality n that was in municipality i in 1991,
and Mnt is the total stock of immigrants from origin country n present in Italy in year t.
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Results, reported in Table 5.2, are somehow in line with the OLS estimates: an inflow of
immigrants increases both the maximum and the average prices. The point estimate for the
minimum price, however, is smaller and fails to be statisticaly different from zero. To assess
the impact on the overall price distribution, we calculate the effect for each quartile of the
price distribution. The estimated coefficients, together with those of minimum and maxi-
mum prices, are plotted in Figure 5.6. As it can be seen the effect is significantly different
from zero only for the upper deciles (from the eight onward) of the price distribution.
Assume rank-invariance (Chernozhukov and Hansen [15])8, then these findings show that
immigrant inflows lead to a relatively slower housing price appreciation in poorer neighbor-
hoods, thus widening the price distribution of wealth within the city.
Based on these results, however, it is not possible to discriminate between the four different
cases highlighted by the theoretical model in Section 5.2.3. Indeed, a stronger increase in
the right part of the price distribution may be obtained if:
• migrants settle in poor neighborhoods, but natives fly to richer ones;
7Due to data availability, we have to aggregate nationalities by geographical areas of origin: Western
Europe, Eastern Europe, North Africa, other countries from Africa, Asia, North America, South America,
and Oceania.
8That is, that the inflow of immigrants does not changes the ranking between quantiles of the price
distribution.
• migrants settle in rich neighborhoods, and natives do not fly away;
• migrants settle uniformly over the municipality, but price elasticity of richer areas is
lower.
To obtain clearer results, we need to directly identify an immigrant inflow localized within
the city boundaries, and study its effect on both the neighborhood affected by it and the
nearby areas.
5.5 Immigration and price dynamics at the neighbor-
hood level
We are collecting data from 19 of the main Italian metropolitan areas.9 For each adminis-
trative district of each metropolitan area, we obtain yearly data on immigrant residents by
nationality in the period 2002-2009. We use AdT data for house prices, and georeference
them in order to impute a yearly average house price for each administrative district. Figure
5.7 shows, as an example, the resulting map of Rome. In each different district (identified
in the figure by a specific color) we compute the house price as the simple average between
prices measured in each AdT microzone.10
5.5.1 Empirical strategy
For each district d ∈ [1, . . . , D], belonging to municipality c ∈ [1, . . . , C] in year t ∈ [1, . . . , T ],
we postulate the existence of a set of potential house prices Pdct(M), each of them charac-
terised by a different value of the treatment M ∈ [M0, . . . ,M1]. The treatment we are
interested in is the stock of immigrants in the district: thus, M0 = 0 and M1 →∞.
9The cities included in the sample are Bergamo, Bologna, Brescia, Cagliari, Genoa, Florence, Lecce,
Modena, Milan, Naples, Padua, Perugia, Prato, Reggio Emilia, Rome, Turin, Udine, Venice, Verona.
10As a robustness check, we may compute the weighted average, with weights proportional to the area of
each microzone. Notice, however, that the eventual measurement error obtained by using a simple average
would ultimately bias our result toward zero.
We want to estimate the effect of a percentage change in the number of immigrants on house
prices relative to the city average. We allow for both a district-level unobserved heterogeneity
and a city-year fixed effects. The resulting model is the following:
logPdct = FEdct + δ logMdct + dct (5.18)
where FEdct = NEIGHBOURHOODdc + (CITYc × Y EARt) is the district and the city-
year fixed effects. The parameter δ = E[E(logPdct − FEdct|M)] is the average treatment
effect.11 Both identification and inference using this simple model face several important
challenges. They include:
i. endogeneity: identification relies on the assumption that Mdct⊥dct|FEdct. This is
unlikely to hold, because there may be time-varying unobserved factors that affect
both immigrant inflows and house price;
ii. reverse causality: immigrants can be pulled or pushed by house price dynamics;
iii. externalities: identification requires that the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA) holds.12 This may be violated if inflows in a certain district affect the
outcome in other districts. Although violation of the SUTVA represents a specific type
of endogeneity, it is worthwhile to consider it separately. In addition, it has obvious
implications for robust inference because it results in intra-municipal correlation in the
error terms;
iv. other inference issues: they include possible heteroskedasticity of the error term and
its potential serial correlation within district, cities, and time periods.
11Notice that in principle, if we have enough observations, we can even estimate the average dose-response
function (Hirano and Imbens (2004)) µ(M) = E(logPdct − FEdct|M).
12SUTVA can be stated as follows: ‘The potential outcomes for any unit do not vary with the treatments
assigned to any other units, and there are no different forms or versions of each treatment ’ (Imbens and
Rubin [38]). Here we deal with the first part of it, and we simply assume that the treatment has only one
form. In general, however, migrant flows can vary in their composition..
Instruments
An instrumental variable approach can deal with issues of endogeneity and reverse causality.
Consider the intra-municipal application of (5.17):
Mˆdct = FEdct + βZdct (5.19)
where Zdct =
∑
n Sh
n
dc,1991×M
n
t is the instrument, generated by the sum of the interactions
between the share of immigrants of nationality n that settled in district d in 1991 and the
inflow of immigrants from country n to Italy in year t.13
The exclusion restriction is based on two assumptions:
IV1: the exogeneity of stocks in 1991 with respect to present trends in house prices;
IV2: there exist no unobserved effect affecting both total immigrant inflows in Italy and
changes in the intra-municipal distribution of prices.
Assumption [IV2] can be discussed more thoroughly. In principle, macroeconomic factors
(such as the business cycle) may affect immigrant inflows and house price distribution. This
is particularly so if trade and remittances from Italy represent a significant part of the
national GDP. To partially control for this possibility, we may use flows directed to Western
European countries other than Italy (Bianchi et al. [9]), or consider an indicator of origin
country instability instead of migrant flows (Nellas and Olivieri [54]).
If we are willing to accept both [IV1] and [IV2], then, estimating (5.18) using E(Mdct|Zdct)
instead of Mdct would result in a consistent estimate of δ.
However, the externality problem is still present. Let us consider it in detail. First, the value
of the instrument in district i may affect the treatment level in district j: being historically
near to an immigrant enclave may be as much important for attracting new immigrants as
being the enclave itself. Second, the treatment level in district i may affect the outcome
13Data on immigrant stocks in 1991 by areas of origin in each district have been computed from the 1991
census-tract data.
variable in district j: being near to a district in which there is a large inflow may indeed
affect house prices.
Dealing with rejection of the SUTVA is possible, to the extent that we identify and model
the mechanism that generates interdependences between observations (Imbens and Rubin
2006). In our case, the driving force seems to be their geographical distance. Then, a
straightforward way to obtain consistent estimate of δ is to control for the (exogenous)
treatment level of nearby areas. There are several ways in which this is possible. Here we
advocate the following model that puts a very light structure to the data and is similar to
the approach of Miguel and Kremer (2004):
logPdct = NEIGHBORHOODd,c+(CITYc×Y EARt)+ δMdct+
D∑
d=1
γdM˜ndct+ nct (5.20)
where Mndct is the (log) of immigrants in the area d kilometers away from the district i’s
border. In order to instrument for both Mndct and the vector of M˜ndct’s, we consider two
possibilities:
SUTVA1: estimate Znct = Mnc,1991 ∗ It for each district n, and then compute
ˆ˜Mndct by
manually averaging the predicted immigrant stocks among areas that are d kilometers
away from the district i’s border. This is the suggestion made by Card;
SUTVA2: instrument M˜ndct with Z˜ndc,1991 =Mndc,1991 ∗ It, that is with the average migrant
stock in an area d kilometers away from district i’s border.
Notice that strategy SUTVA1 relies on the assumption that rejection of the SUTVA is present
only at time t. SUTVA2, instead, makes our identification robust even to the possibility that
1991 stock in district i affects flows today in district j.
Inference
To perform inference on the results we should rely on heteroskedasticity-robust and cluster-
robust standard errors. The cluster dimensions should in principle be two: city and time.14
Notice, however, that two-way cluster-robust standard errors can be computed only if the
number of clusters get to infinity (Thompson 2009). This represents a case in favor of
the enlargement of the dataset, given that non-clustered standard errors may be biased
downwardly in the presence of positive serial correlation over time or space (Bertrand et al.
2004), thus potentially inducing a type I error.
5.5.2 Preliminary OLS results
In this section, we provide some preliminary results for a set of 8 municipalities (Bologna,
Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Rome, Trieste, and Turin).
We start estimating the relationship between native and immigrant population growth at
the neighborhood level. Formally, we run the following regression:
Ndct = α + βMdct + Y EARt +NEIGHBORHOODdc + νdct (5.21)
The key explanatory variable is M , that is the log of immigrants in neighborhood d of city c
in year t. We also include year dummies to take out the effects of economy wide conditions
on population dynamics, and neighbourhood fixed effects to control for any time-invariant
omitted variable at that level of analysis. In Table 5.3, we show that there is a negative
relationship between immigration and native population growth. The coefficient is significant
at the conventional levels. According to our estimates, the doubling of immigrant population
in one neighbourhood leads to a 5 percent decrease in native population.
As far as house price dynamics are concerned, we perform the OLS estimate of (5.20).
Results reported in Table 5.4 show that a 10% increase in immigrant stock relative to the
14The district cluster is nested into the city one.
city average is correlated with a house price growth that is 0.8% lower with respect to the
city average. This effect is however not statistically different from zero.
5.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have summarized some preliminary findings obtained so far in the study of
the impact of immigration on house price distribution within Italian metropolitan areas.
First, we have estimated the effect of an exogenous increase in the immigrant population
on several indicators of house price distribution. We found a positive effect of immigration
on the mean price, which can be mostly ascribed to the raise in the upper two deciles of
the price distribution. Second, vary preliminary results from a unique dataset on residential
population at the neighborhood level show that an inflow of immigrants is correlated with a
within-city reallocation of natives towards areas less affected by immigrant inflows.
All these findings can be (at least in part) explained by the movement of natives from the
neighbourhoods affected by the immigrant inflow toward other areas of the same city. This
phenomenon is consistent with the huge evidence of residential segregation of immigrants
in poorer and less wealthy areas. Although highly preliminary, our results point to a direct
causal effect of immigration on segregation, net of any reverse causality or endogeneity
issue.
What remains unclear is what drives this effect. We can consider three different causes
for it through which immigrants negatively impact on what we name local amenities in
our model. First, native outflow may be driven by preference for “ethnic segregation”:
natives display a ceteris paribus preference for living in an ethnically similar neighbourhood.
Second, natives may have preferences for “socio-economic segregation”: they prefer to live
near individuals of same (or higher) status. Third, immigration may have a detrimental
effect on the quality of real estate. This may happen for two reasons: on the one hand,
immigrants may have less incentive to invest on the house they live in, maybe because they
are likely to remain there for shorter periods with respect to natives; on the other hand, there
may be a lower incentive for the municipal administration to invest in areas where the share
of immigrants increase, since in Italy (as in several other countries), non-EU immigrants
are deprived of political rights and, thus, have less voice in the local political agenda. We
may call this possible channel “political segregation”. Although a precise identification of
each channel may be very difficult, it would be extremely important for policy implications.
While the presence of socio-economic discrimination may be reduced by policies aimed at
improving the economic integration of immigrants, ethnic discrimination may be harder to
counter. Political discrimination, in turn, may be reduced by improving the political rights
of immigrant residents. Future research to disentangle these different channels is needed.
5.7 Tables and Figures
Table 5.1: OLS estimate of the effect of an immigrant inflow on house prices
Log Mean Log Max Log Min Log (Max-Min) Coeff.
Price Price Price Price of Var.
Log-Immigrants 0.129 0.130 0.124 0.175 0.071
(0.025)*** (0.028)*** (0.026)*** (0.063)*** (0.050)
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Unobs. Heterogeneity Y Y Y Y Y
Overall R-sq. 0.310 0.410 0.155 0.129 0.067
No. of Obs. 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358
No. of FE 672 672 672 672 672
Notes: heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the LLM level in parentheses.
Table 5.2: IV estimate of the effect of an immigrant inflow on house prices
Log Mean Log Max Log Min Log (Max-Min) Coeff.
Price Price Price Price of Var.
Log-Immigrants 0.272 0.303 0.218 0.531 -0.036
(0.124)** (0.128)** (0.159) (0.315)* (0.054)
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Unobs. Heterogeneity Y Y Y Y Y
Adj. R-sq. 0.475 0.483 0.283 -0.322 -0.181
No. of Obs. 4457 4457 4454 4457 4362
No. of FE 670 670 670 670 670
F-test of excl.instr. 53.08 53.08 53.08 53.08 53.08
Notes: heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the LLM level in parentheses.
Table 5.3: OLS estimate of the effect of an immigrant inflow on native population at the
neighborhood level
Log-Immigrants -0.025 -0.024 -0.020 -0.020
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Year Effects N Y Y Y
City Effects N N Y Y
Neighborhood Effects N N N Y
R-sq. 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.34
No. of Obs. 833 833 833 833
Notes: heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered in parentheses.
Table 5.4: OLS estimate of the effect of an immigrant inflow on house prices at the neigh-
borhood level
Log-Immigrants -0.077
(0.051)
City x Year Effects Y
Neighborhood Effects Y
R-sq. 0.92
No. of Obs. 553
Notes: heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered in parentheses.
Figure 5.1: Trends in Various House Price Indicators - 2003-2009
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Figure 5.2: Correlation between changes in immigrant and native population - 2003-2009
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Figure 5.3: Correlation between changes in immigrant population (2003-2009) and house
prices in 2003
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Figure 5.4: Correlation between changes in immigrant population and changes in house
prices (2003-2009)
Coeff.: 0.332 ***
0
2
4
6
8
Ch
. Im
m.
 P
op
.
−1 0 1 2 3
Ch. Price of Housing
Changes in Imm. Pop. and Changes in House Prices (2003−2009)
Figure 5.5: Correlation between changes in immigrant population and changes in the coeffi-
cient of variation of house prices (2003-2009)
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Figure 5.6: Estimates of the quantile treatment effect - IV estimates
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Figure 5.7: Map of Rome - administrative districts (colors) and AdT microzones (lines)
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